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Abstract
The dissertation studies what determines the different response of the economy to
fiscal stabilizations, and fiscal policy in general, and investigates the channels through
which fiscal policy influence the macroeconomy.
The first chapter analyzes the determinants and channels through which fiscal
stabilizations influence the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth. Using
data from a panel of OECD countries, the chapter shows that the success of fiscal
adjustments in decreasing the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the size of the improvement
in the primary balance. The composition of fiscal policy and the rate of growth ofoutput
are less important. In contrast, whether a fiscal adjustment is expansionary depends
largely on the composition of the fiscal maneuver. The effects of the composition on
growth work mostly through the labor market rather than through agents' expectations of
future fiscal policy. Finally, the evidence suggests that successful and expansionary fiscal
contractions are not the result of accompanying expansionary monetary policy or
exchange rate devaluations.
The second chapter (joint work with Alesina, Perotti, and Schiantarelli) evaluates
the effects of fiscal policy on investment using a panel ofOECD countries. In particular,
we investigate how different types of fiscal policy affect profits and, as a result,
investment. We find a sizeable negative effect of public spending - and in particular of its
public wage component - on business investment. This result is consistent with models in
which government employment creates wage pressure for the private sector. Various
types of taxes also have negative effects on profits, but, interestingly, the effects of
government spending on investment are larger than the effect of taxes. Our results have
important implications for the so called "non-Keynesian" (i.e. expansionary) effects of
fiscal adjustments.
The third chapter sets up a dynamic general equilibrium model, and investigates
the long and short run effects that changes in different spending and revenue items ofthe
budget have on the economy when the labor market is unionized. The model is calibrated
using average data for the European countries and finds support for the labor market
channel in general equilibrium as well.
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Introduction
In the last three decades, fiscal policy in many GECD countries has experi-
enced large swings. In the seventies and early eighties, fiscal profligacy led to
the accumulation of large deficits. Then, from the mid eighties onward, several
governments implemented large fiscal adjustments, cutting the deficit by several
points of GDP in short periods of time. In the last years the number of countries
tightening the budget increased substantially. Many European countries tried to
fulfill the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, and join the EMU in the first
round. Those who made it are still going through periods of fiscal consolidations
to meet the criteria of the Stability Pact. Just to mention a few examples, in 1990
the structural deficit as a percentage of potential GDP was 11.8 in Italy, 6.6 in
Belgium, 604 in the Netherlands, and 7.2 in Spain. In the following eight years,
Italy reduced the structural deficit by IDA percentage points of potential GDP,
Belgium by 5.9, the Netherlands by 4.4 and Spain by 5.6. Large improvernents in
the government balance also occurred in non European countries. In the US, the
structural deficit as a share of potential GDP was 3.3% in 1990, and in 1998 the
US obtained a surplus of almost 1% of potential GDP. In Canada, the structural
deficit was cut by 6.8 percentage points of potential GDP in the same period.
As recent literature has highlighted, the response of the economy to these fis-
cal adjustments has varied substantially: in some cases (but not in all) the fiscal
tightening led to a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio; in several episodes (but
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not in all) private consumption, private investment, and GDP growth rates in-
creased during the consolidation and in its immediate aftermath, contrary to the
predictions of a standard Keynesian model. Even though episodes of rapid fiscal
expansions have been relatively less studied, there is evidence of "non keynesian
effects" in this direction as well, namely that several fiscal expansions have been
contractionary.
The motivation of the dissertation is to understand what determines the differ-
ent response of the economy to fiscal consolidations, and through which channels
fiscal policy influences the economy.
Two non-mutually exclusive explanations have been proposed as determinants
of the different outcomes that characterize fiscal adjustments/expansions in the
OEeD countries. One view is related to the impact that current fiscal policy has
on the economy through its influence on agents' expectations about the stance
of the future fiscal policy (the expectation view). This literature predicts that a
fiscal contraction (expansion) can be expansionary (contractionary) if agents view
the current fiscal policy as a change in fiscal policy regime. For example, a fiscal
consolidation can be associated with a boom of the economy if agents perceive
that the adjustment will lead to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio and
lower taxes in the future. In this case, in fact, the fiscal adjustment generates a
positive wealth effect, and current private demand components increase despite a
fiscal tightening is taking place.
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The other view stresses the effect of the composition of current fiscal policy
(whether the deficit reduction is achieved through tax increases or through spend-
ing cuts) on the economy through the labor market and the cost side of the firms
(the labor market view). This view predicts that stabilizations that result from
cutting public spending, especially transfers and government wage bills, rather
than increasing taxes are more likely to be successful and expansionary. They in-
duce a moderation in the wage claims by unions, stimulating employment, capital
accumulation, and growth.
The first chapter of the dissertation studies empirically the determinants of
the different outcomes that characterize fiscal adjustment programs in the OEeD
countries. It focuses on the medium-term response of the debt-to-GDP ratio and
on GDP growth, and tests the importance of the channels through which tight
fiscal policies lead to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio and to a boom in
the economy.
The evidence in the chapter suggests that the labor market channel is more im-
portant than the expectation channel, and that the composition of the stabilization
package is a crucial element for growth. More specifically, the data show that the
composition of current fiscal policy has a large and statistically significant effect
on GDP growth through the labor market channel. The economy booms when a
large fraction of the improvement in the budget is due to spending cuts, especially
cuts in the governrnent wage bill. In most specifications, in contrast, the size and
3
the composition of the stabilization package do not have a statistically significant
effect on GDP growth via their effect on agents' expectations of whether or not the
fiscal contraction will lead to the stabilization of the public debt. Furthermore, the
probability that the debt-to..GDP ratio will decrease within a few years after the
consolidation depends more on the variables measuring the size of the adjustment
than on those capturing the composition. Thus, although fiscal policies that differ
in composition are likely to have various degrees of persistence, their impact on
the dynamics of government debt is not as large as that of the improvement in the
primary balance.
The second chapter of the dissertation concentrates on the response of business
investment to changes in fiscal policy. Even a cursory look at episodes of large
swings in fiscal policy suggests that private investment explains a disproportionate
share of the response of GDP growth to these large changes in the fiscal stance.
Hence, in order to better understand the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in
OECD countries, one needs to shift the focus of the analysis to business invest-
ments. The chapter relies on econometric evidence on a panel of OECD countries
to assess the effects of taxation and expenditure on investment. It focuses on the
role of profits as a determinant of investment and it shows that the composition
of changes in fiscal policy is particularly important for profits.
The paper finds a sizeable negative effect of public spending - and in particular
of its public wage component - on business investment. Various types of taxes
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also have negative effects on profits, but, interestingly, the effects of government
spending on investment are larger than the effect of taxes. These results are
consistent with models in which government employment creates wage pressure
for the private sector.
The third chapter of the dissertation tackles the question from a different angle.
Given the strong empirical evidence in favor of the labor market view in chapter 1
and chapter 2, this chapter sets up a dynamic general equilibrium model to investi-
gate the long and short run effects that changes in different spending and revenue
items of the budget have on the economy when the labor market is unionized.
More specifically, the chapter studies the reaction of employment, capital, output,
consumption, and the government balance to changes in public employment, wages
of the public sector employees, unemployment benefits, tax rates on labor and on
capital income. The model is calibrated using average data of the European coun-
tries, and finds support for the labor market channel in general equilibrium as
well.
An increase in public employment, wages of the public sector employees, unem-
ployment benefits, labor taxes have a contractionary effect on the economy. These
effects occur through the supply-side and the cost side of the firms. In fact, unions
set higher wages for the private sector employees in response to an increase in one
of the above fiscal policy items. This reduces employment in the private sector, in-
creases the capital-labor ratio, and lowers the rate of return on capital. Investment
5
decreases and output contracts. The chapter also contributes to the evidence that
fiscal consolidations that rely mostly on spending cuts are more likely to improve
the budget. The primary deficit decreases more when public employment, wages
of the public sector employees, unemployment benefits are cut than when labor
taxes and taxes on capital are increased.
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Chapter 1
Fiscal Stabilizations: When Do They
Work and Why
1 Introduction
This chapter studies empirically the determinants of the different outcomes that
characterize fiscal adjustment programs in the OECD countries. As disussed in the
introduction, in some cases (but not in all) the fiscal tightening led to a reduction
of the debt-to-GDP ratio; in several episodes (but not in all) private consumption,
private investment, and GDP growth rates increased during the consolidation and
in its immediate aftermath, contrary to the predictions of a standard Keynesian
model. 1 The chapter focuses on the medium-term response of the debt-to-GDP
ratio and on GDP growth, and tests the importance of the alternative channels
through which tight fiscal policies lead to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP
ratio and to a boom in the economy.
Two non-mutually exclusive explanations have been proposed for successful (i.e.
leading to a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio) and expansionary (i.e. leading
l8oo, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti (1995) and (1997a),
Alffiina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and (1996), McDermot and
Wescott (1996), and Zaghini (1999).
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to a boom in the economy) fiscal stabilizations. One view is related to the impact
that current fiscal policy has on the economy through its influence on agents'
expectations about the stance of the future fiscal policy (the expectation view).
This literature predicts that a fiscal contraction can be expansionary if agents
perceive that the adjustment signals a change in regime that will lead to the
stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio and solve the country's fiscal imbalance.
For example, the fiscal contraction generates a positive wealth effect and aggregate
demand can increase if, in response to an increase in current taxation, agents expect
that fiscal policy in the future need not be tighter, or even anticipate a reduction in
the tax burden.2 The other view stresses the effect of the composition of current
fiscal policy (whether the deficit reduction is achieved through tax increases or
through spending cuts) on the economy through the labor market and the cost
)
side of the firms (the labor market view). This view predicts that stabilizations
that result from cutting public spending, especially transfers and government wage
bills, rather than increasing taxes are more likely to be successful and expansionary.
They induce a moderation in the wage claims by unions, stimulating employment,
capital accumulation, and growth.3
There is evidence of both channels in the literature, but there has been no
2See Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), Drazen (1990), Miller et al. (1990), and
Sutherland (1997) for models that explain expansionary fiscal contractions through this channel.
3See Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and Perotti (1997b), Daveri and Tabellini (1997), and Lane
and Perotti (1999).
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attempt to provide an overall empirical assessment of the relative importance of
one view versus the other. One of the goals of this paper is to bridge this gap.
The evidence presented here shows that the labor market channel is more impor-
tant than the expectation channel, and that the composition of the stabilization
package is a crucial element for growth. More specifically, the data show that the
composition of current fiscal policy has a large and statistically significant effect
on GDP growth through the labor market channel. The economy booms when a
large fraction of the improvement in the budget is due to spending cuts, especially
cuts in the government wage bill. In most specifications, in contrast, the size and
the composition of the stabilization package do not have a statistically significant
effect on GDP growth via their effect on agents' expectations of whether or not the
fiscal contraction will lead to the stabilization of the public debt. Furthermore, the
probability that the debt-to-GDP ratio will decrease within a few years after the
consolidation depends more on the variables measuring the size of the adjustment
than on those capturing the composition. Thus, although fiscal policies that differ
in composition are likely to have various degrees of persistence, their impact on
the dynamics of government debt is not as large as that of the improvement in the
primary balance.
The paper reaches some additional interesting conclusions. First, current GDP
growth has only a small effect on the likelihood of a successful stabilization. An
important criticism of the empirical literature that relates the success of the fiscal
9
maneuver to its size and composition is that it does not account for the differences
in GDP growth rates. Successful fiscal adjustments can result simply from higher
GDP growth (due, for example, to other policy measures) rather than from different
fiscal packages. The evidence of this paper rules out this possibility. In fact, a one
percent increase in the growth rate of output increases the probability that the
consolidation stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio by about four percentage points.
More importantly, in many specifications, this effect is not statistically significant.
Second, the paper provides little evidence that successful and expansionary fiscal
adjustments hinge on countries' initial conditions. Eichengreen (1998), among
others, argues that the macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments depend on
initial conditions, in particular on whether or not fiscal policy is on a sustainable
course. This paper shows to the contrary that the initial level of the debt as a
)
share of GDP is not statistically significant in many specifications. Moreover, all
the above results are almost identical if one includes in the sample only those
country-years with high initial levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio, of the primary
spending-to-GDP ratio, and of the growth rate of the debt as a share of GDP.
Finally, the evidence shows that episodes of successful and expansionary fiscal
contractions are not simply due to expansionary monetary policy and exchange
rate devaluations implemented to offset the fiscal contraction, as previous research
has suggested. In fact, controlling for the stance of monetary policy around the
time of the fiscal stabilization does not alter the conclusions on the determinants
10
and the channels through which fiscal policy influences the economy.
This paper is related to Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti
(1995), and (1997a), Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998), McDermott and Wescott
(1996), IMF (1996), GEeD (1996). However, it differs from these works along sev-
eral critical dimensions. First, it employs a different methodology: the previous
papers draw their conclusions on the basis of descriptive statistics on the char-
acteristics of different fiscal adjustments and on their macroeconomic outcomes.
In contrast, this paper relies on an econometric analysis to reach the results de-
scribed above. Second, this paper is the first to try to test the importance of the
channels through which fiscal policy induces a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio
and an expansion in output. Third, it vastly improves upon Alesina and Ardagna
(1998) and on McDermott and Wescott (1996) by addressing the joint endogeneity
of the likelihood that governments implement successful fiscal consolidations and
of GDP growth, and by controlling for the stance of monetary and exchange rate
policies around the time of the adjustment. Finally, the paper explicitly accounts
for the fact that what can matter for economic activity is not only the current dis-
cretionary reduction in the deficit, but also the resulting exPectations about the
stance of future fiscal policy. Previous research on the expectation view does not
estimate agents' expectations that the adjustment will lead to a sustainable level
of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the future; instead, it proxies the effect that current
fiscal policy has on agents' expectations about the stance of future fiscal policy
11
with a dummy variable measuring the size and the persistence of the improvement
in the budget.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarlZes the theories that
explain the expansionary fiscal contractions and their empirical implications. Sec-
tion 3 describes the econometric and data issues and illustrates the specification
for the benchmark model. Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 checks
their robustness. The last section concludes.
2 Theory: the expectation view and the labor
market view
This section reviews the theories of the effects of fiscal adjustments on the macroe-
conomy and discusses more extensively their empirical implications. Subsection
2.1 summarizes the expectation view according to which fiscal stabilizations may
be expansionary if agents view the fiscal maneuver as a change in regime that
will solve the countries' fiscal imbalance and, thus, "eliminates the need for larger,
maybe much more disruptive adjustments in the future" (Blanchard (1990)).
The subsection labor market view reviews the literature on the effects of fiscal
policy in imperfect and unionized labor markets.4
4 Needless to say, expectations about future fiscal policy can also play an important role in
models that emphasize the effect of fiscal policy through the labor market. However, contrary to
the predictions of the expectation view, according to the labor market view, expansionary fiscal
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2.1 The expectation view
Consider a country that is running a deficit resulting in increasing public debt. To
satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, the government implements at some
point in time a debt-stabilization program. The fiscal maneuver can consist in an
increase in taxation and/or a cut in public spending.
Consider first a stabilization implemented by increasing taxation. If taxes are
lump-sum, and there are no other distortions in the economy that prevent infinitely
lived agents to smooth their consumption optimally over time, Ricardian equiva-
lence holds. Hence, an increase in current taxation has no effect on current private
consumption.
To rationalize a boom in economic activity from an increase in current taxes,
the deadweight cost of taxation has to increase with the tax rate. This means
that the longer the government waits to stabilize (hence, the higher the tax rate
required), the greater the costs and the permanent distortions that the fiscal ma-
neuver introduces in the economy. More specifically, suppose that the distortions
introduced by taxation imply a loss of output. If the decrease in output increases
with the tax rate or if it materializes only when the tax rate reaches a threshold,
an increase in current taxation avoids a tighter and more costly fiscal adj ustment
in the future. In fact, it removes the danger of an even sharper loss of output;
contractions do not depend on whether agents perceive that fiscal policy will be sustainable or
not after the consolidation.
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this generates a positive wealth effect and induces an increase in current private
consumption.5
If agents have a finite life and are not altruistic, or if they are liquidity con-
strained, the increase in current taxation, however, also has a negative effect on
private consumption, reducing agents' disposable income. In this case, current
private consumption booms only if the positive wealth effect from the increase
in taxation is large enough to outweigh the negative one on current disposable
Income.
Initial conditions may be important as well. In a model with finitely lived
agents, in which there exists a ceiling on the public debt-to..GDP ratio beyond
which taxes are increased, an increase in current taxation can be expansionary if
it occurs at high levels of the debt. In fact, the fiscal tightening avoids the debt
reaching a ceiling, and, thus, the current generation will not have to pay higher
taxes.6
Consider, now, a stabilization achieved by cutting public spending. In a stan-
dard neoclassical model, for a given level of current taxation, a cut in government
consumption that is expected to be permanent generates a positive wealth effect.
Agents anticipate a reduction in the future tax liabilities and an increase in their
wealth, and so they increase their current private consumption. A model with real
rigidities in the labor market and credit-constrained. individuals can account for
5See Blanchard (1990).
6See Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999).
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why a consolidation by decreasing public spending is expansionary in some cir-
cumstances, but not in others. In fact, a cut in public spending also has a negative
effect on the private consumption of the liquidity-constrained households via its
negative effect on employment, and hence on income. Thus, a stabilization realized
by cutting public spending leads to an increase in aggregate private consumption
only .if the positive wealth effect offsets the negative one.7
An additional channel through which current fiscal policy can influence the
economy via its effect on agents' expectations is the interest rate. If agents believe
that the stabilization is "credible" and avoids a default on government debt, they
can ask for a lower premium on government bonds. Private demand components
sensitive to the real interest rate can increase if the reduction in the interest rate
paid on government bonds leads to a reduction in the real interest rate charged to
consumers and firms. Also, the appreciation of stocks and bonds resulting from
the decrease in the interest rates can favor a consumption/investment boom, in-
creasing agents' financial wealth. Moreover, if people believe that the stabilization
eliminates the danger of a default crisis and have quite a substantial share of their
wealth in government bonds, they can be willing to consume and invest more, be-
cause the adjustment removes the uncertainty about the "availability" of this part
of their wealth.
Based on the previous discussion, the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the size of
7See Perotti (1999).
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the adjustment and its composition (i.e. whether the deficit reduction is achieved
through tax increases, spending cuts, or changes in some particular spending and
revenue items) are important elements for the wealth effect to induce a boom in
the economy in response to a fiscal contraction. At higher levels of the debt-
to..GDP ratio, the wealth effect from a current stabilization is stronger and the
fiscal adjustment is more likely to be expansionary. Similarly, the larger the cuts
in deficit, the more people expect that the current fiscal contraction stabilizes the
debt-to..GDP ratio and that there will be no need for further fiscal tightening in the
future. The effect can be nonlinear because agents can believe that the stabilization
will be successful only if the reduction in the primary deficit is substantial. In this
case, the change in the primary balance triggers a reduction in the debt-to..GDP
ratio. Thus, the positive wealth effect will be greater and it can more easily
dominate any negative effect that the increase in taxes or the reduction in public
spending has on private demand through the standard Keynesian effect.8 Finally,
a government that reduces the deficit by cutting spending more than by increasing
taxes, one that cuts the "untouchable" items of the budget (transfers, government
wages, public employment) is likely to be seen as a more "serious" and committed
government. It is willing to undertake unpopular policy measures, which, most
likely, will have more permanent effects on the budget. Thus, the public expects
with a higher probability a stabilization of the debt-to..GDP ratio and an increase
8See Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) on private consumption and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano
(1998) on private saving.
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in economic activity is more likely to happen.
2.2 The labor market view
Consider an economy with an imperfect and unionized labor market. 9 For simplic-
ity, assume that the firms and the government choose the level of employment. A
monopoly union, instead, sets the real wage, maximizing the expected utility of its
members subject to the total demand of labor in the economy. The expected utility
of the representative union member is a weighted average of his utility if employed,
and if unemployed, with weights equal to the fraction of employed and unemployed
members respectively. The expected utility of the representative member thus de-
pends on his after-tax income, on the probability of his being unemployed, and on
members' reservation utility.
Consider the effect of an increase in income taxes or in social security contribu-
tions paid by the workers. For a given pre-tax real wage, this policy measure lowers
the after-tax real wage and induces the union to ask for an increase in the pre-tax
9Traditionally, the effect of fiscal policy through the supply side has been analyzed in the
context of the standard neoclassical model with perfectly competitive labor markets. See, for
instance, Baxter and King (1993), Dotsey and Mao (1994), LudvigBOn (1996), and Olivei (1998).
The literature that studies the effect of the fiscal adjustments on the economy has shifted the
focus to models with imperfect and unionized labor markets for two reasons. First, these models
reflect in a more realistic way the labor markets of most OECD countries. Second, the effects
from a standard neoclassical model and the empirical evidence from episodes of fiscal stabilization
often go in opposite directions.
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real wage. The equilibrium wage rate increases. This leads to a reduction of the
equilibrium level of employment and of the shadow value of capital, with negative
effects on capital accumulation and on growth. Also, in an open economy model,
the wage pressure leading to higher unit labor costs reduces firms' competitiveness,
and as a consequence, exports, employment and output fall. IO
Consider now the effect of changes in public spending. An increase in govern-
ment employment, in government wages, and in unemployment benefits can have
negative effects on the economy as well, because it tightens the labor market and
strengthens unions' power. In fact, an increase in public employment reduces the
probability of being unemployed. Because public employment represents an alter-
native to private employment, higher levels of the former or of public wages also
increase the reservation utility of unions' members. Similarly, an increase in unem-
ployment benefits or in transfers reduces the cost of being unemployed. Hence, any
increase in the above public spending items puts pressure on the equilibrium wage,
with the same negative consequences for the economy as those from the increase
in labor taxation.
In summary, the composition of the fiscal maneuver is crucial in this type of
models. A fiscal adjustment is more likely to be expansionary if it relies more on
spending cuts than on tax increases, and if a substantial share of the spending cut
10See Daveri and Tabellini (1997), and Alesina et al. (1999) on the effect of fiscal policy
in imperfect and unionized labor markets in a closed economy model; see Alesina and Perotti
(1997b), and Lane and Perotti (1999) for open economy models.
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regards the government wage bill. In contrast, deficit reductions realized through
increasing taxes are more likely to be contractionary. The effect is greater if a large
part of the increase in total revenue comes from an increase in labor taxes.
3 Methodology, data, and benchmark specifica-
tion
This section describes the methodology applied for the estimation, the data, and
the benchmark specification. First, the section discusses the single equation ap-
proach, which I use to estimate the ability governments have to solve the fiscal
imbalance. I calculate agents' expectations that the fiscal contraction will lead,
within a few years, to the stabilization of the debt-to..GDP ratio. Then, I use this
variable as a regressor in the GDP growth equation to provide an overall empirical
assessment of the relative importance of the expectation view. I, then, present a
simultaneous equations approach, which takes into account a potential problem
of simultaneity between the governments' ability to solve the fiscal imbalance and
GDP growth. Finally, the section discusses the choice of the sample, the data and
gives some definitions.
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3.1 Single equation approach
3.1.1 Successful stabilizations
The ability/propensity of a government to solve a fiscal imbalance, s·, is a latent
variable not directly observed. The paper assumes, instead, that we observe a
discrete variable s. s indicates whether or not governments undertake substantial
discretionary cuts in the deficit-to-GDP ratio and obtain, within a few years, a
reduction in the debt as a share of GDP (i.e. reach a successful stabilization). The
definition of successful and unsuccessful stabilizations is given in section 3.3.
There are two reasons one may want to follow this approach. First, the lit-
erature on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments is not concerned with
small and continuous changes in the debt as a share of GDP. Rather, it looks at
the impact of large and persistent reductions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio that
result from discretionary improvements in the budget. Second, as discussed in the
section on the expectation view, whether a fiscal adjustment has a positive effect
on the economy may depend on agents' perception of the stabilization as lead-
ing to a change in the fiscal regime that will solve the fiscal imbalance. A small
and continuous change in the debt-to-GDP ratio that does not result from any
improvement in the budget can hardly be interpreted as a change in fiscal policy
regime. Thus, this paper uses a limited dependent variable estimation method and
estimates the following probit specification for s*:
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1 if Sit> 0
Sit = {
ootherwise
and
Ulit - N(O, CTD (1)
(2)
(3)
where i = {1, .... , I} indicates the countries in the sample and t = {1, .... ,T}
the annual observation.
From equation (2), the fiscal adjustment is successful (Sit = 1) if governments'
ability to solve the fiscal imbalance is large (sit> 0), and it is unsuccessful (Sit = 0)
when Sit::; O. Equation (3) for Sit describes agents' expectations about Sit. Sit and
Sit, are modeled as a function of the economic and political variables Yit-l, Xlit,
Xcit. Equation (3) assumes that Yit-l, Xlit, Xcit belong to agents' information set at
time t.
Yit-l is the real per capita GDP growth rate lagged one period. Governments
can be more willing to engage in restrictive fiscal policies during expansions than
during recessions. Cutting spending or raising taxes is less costly politically and
may meet lower resistance from the public in "good" times than in "bad" ones.
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Xlit and Xcit are 1 X kl , 1 x kc vectors of explanatory variables. The variables
in Xcit are also included as regressors in the GDP growth equation. They describe
two important characteristics of the fiscal package: the size of the improvement in
the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a share of GDP, and the composition
of the change in the cyclically adj usted primary balance. More precisely, the
benchmark specification includes the dummy variables Size and Camp. Size is
equal to one if the improvement in the primary balance/GDP is greater than
the average improvement over episodes of fiscal adjustments. l1 Camp is equal
to one if more than 50% of the improvement in the primary balance is due to a
cut in primary spending, minus one if more than 50% of the deterioration in the
primary balance is due to an increase in primary spending, and zero otherwise.
The coefficients of Size and Camp should be positive (see section 2).
There are several reasons to measure the composition of fiscal policy with the
dummy variable Compo First, it takes into account that expectations on the future
stance of fiscal policy can depend positively on substantial cuts in primary spending
but also negatively on huge increases. One would not be able to estimate the latter
effect by considering two separate dummies, one for cases in which more than 50%
of the improvement in the primary balance is due to a cut in primary spending,
and one for cases in which more than 50% of the deterioration in the primary
11 In section 5.3, I replace the variable Size with the change in the primary balance as a share
of GDP and its square to test for a nonlinear effect of the change in the primary balance on s·
and GDP growth.
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balance is due to an increase in primary spending. In fact, because of the discrete
specification of equation (1), the latter dummy variable would perfectly predict the
unsuccessful fiscal adjustments. 12 Second, a continuous variable that measures the
proportion of the change in primary balance due to changes in primary spending
makes it difficult to interpret the results. The sign of the, ratio of the change in
primary spending over the change in primary deficit depends both on the sign of
the numerator and of the denumerator. One can observe all four combinations of
spending and deficit cuts or increases. Finally, a discrete variable that captures
the composition of the fiscal policy avoids problems with extremely high or low
values that the variable can take when, for example, the deficit decreases and both
spending and taxes are cut.13
12The indicator variable s is always equal to zero if there is a deterioration in the primary
balance-to-GDP ratio (see definition 1 in section 3.3). Consider a variable that measures the
composition of the fiscal policy only when this is lax and that is equal to zero when fiscal policy
is tight. s is always zero for all the observations in which the above variable is nonzero. For this
reason, it is not possible to estimate separately the effect of the fiscal policy composition when
there is an improvement and a deterioration in the balance.
13In section 5.3, I also consider specifications in which the composition of the fiscal package is
measured either by a dummy variable equal to one if more than 50% of the improvement in the
primary balance is due to a cut in primary spending and zero otherwise, or by a semicontinuous
variable equal to the proportion of the improvement in primary balance due to changes in primary
spending and zero otherwise. Moreover, I also measure the effects from the composition of fiscal
policy accounting for the effect from changes in the composition of spending and revenue items.
23
The specification in (1) - (3) assumes that agents know both the size and the
composition of the fiscal policy package at time t. This assumption is not too
far from reality, or, at least, is less implausible than the alternative; politicians
usually discuss and approve the budget for a year during the second half of the
previous year. Sometimes they make additional fiscal policy changes during the
year, but these usually represent a small fraction of the budget. Moreover, Size and
Camp have been computed using the cyclically adjusted changes in the fiscal policy
variables. Thus, they do not change automatically with business cycle fluctuations.
The vector Xl includes political variables that measure both the ideology of the
government in office and its type. More specifically, Left, Centre, and Majority are
dummy variables equal to one if the government in office is left or centre oriented,
and if it is a single party having the majority in the Parliament, respectively, and
zero otherwise.14 The literature that relates governments' political characteristics
and fiscal policy outcomes considers the effect of the ideology and the fragmenta-
tion of the governments on the changes in the deficit to GDP ratio and/or in its
components. 15 Equation (1) already controls for the effect of the size and the com-
position of the fiscal packages. However, political characteristics can playa role
beyond their effect on the size and composition. For example, agents might be-
14If there are changes of government during the year, the government in office for the highest
number of months determines the type of the government for that year.
l5See Kontopoulus and Perotti (1997) for a review of the theorical contributions and for an
empirical analysis.
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lieve that left-wing governments have more chances to stabilize the debt-to-GDP
ratio than right-wing ones. Because of the left's support from unions and from
pensioners, they can communicate the need for the adjustment16 and stick to their
policy in the future more easily. Similarly, agents might think that single-party
majority governments are less likely to abandon the program in the future than
are coalition or minority cabinets.
The debt-to-GDP ratio lagged one period is also included in Xl. The higher
the level of the debt, the "easier" it can be for the government in office to take
restrictive fiscal policy measures. Their need is well recognized, and thus the
cabinet can find wide and more permanent support for its package.17 Moreover, as
summarized in section 2, at higher levels of debt, fiscal adjustments are more likely
to increase economic activity, which eases the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio,
increasing the denominator of the ratio and reducing the deficit via the automatic
stabilizers.
3.1.2 GDP growth
Equation (4) describes the real per capita GDP growth regression:
U2it - (0, (T~) (4)
8ft is generated using equation (3) and the estimates from equation (1); Xcit and
X2it are 1 X kc and 1 X k2 vectors of explanatory variables.
16This argument is similar to the one in Cukierman and Tommasi (1998).
17800, for instance, Obstfeld (1998).
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A positive and statistically significant 12 shows evidence in favor of the ex-
pectation view (see section 2). The more agents perceive that the government is
able to solve the fiscal imbalance, the more they expect that future fiscal policy
will not need to be tighter than current fiscal policy, and both private current
consumption and investment can increase. If the increase in current consumption
and investment offsets the slowdown in public consumption (which usually takes
place during fiscal adjustments), GDP growth increases. 18
In the benchmark specification, the vector Xc includes the dummy variables Size
18 A possible argument against this claim is that, in a standard neoclassical model, an expected
cut in public spending leads to an increase in private consumption. Thus, the fact that agents
expect that future fiscal policy will not need to be tighter can actually be bad, not good, news.
There are, however, at least two points that work against this objection. The first is closely
related to the models reviewed section 2.1. If agents perceive that the government is not able
to solve the current fiscal imbalance, they know that fiscal policy will be tighter in the future.
They have to be certain that the tightness consists in a spending cut in order to increase their
current consumption. If they think that the government will increase future taxes, then this
would work against the increase in private consumption. The second point is more general.
While the neoclassical model delivers a negative relation between public spending and private
consumption, the effect on private investment and output is ambiguous. It depends on how the
change in public spending is financed, on the elasticity of the individual labor supply, and on
the persistence of the stochastic processes of the fiscal policy variables. Even with distortionary
taxation, the individual labor supply must be fairly elastic to obtain an increase in output growth
in response to a cut in public spending. As it is well known, there is a large amount of evidence
that the individual labor supply does not react much in response to changes in fiscal policy.
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and Camp described above. I expect a negative, or at best insignificant, coefficient
on Size. Once we control for the effect that the change in the primary balance
has on agents' expectations, a greater reduction in the primary deficit-to-GDP
ratio decreases economic growth through the standard Keynesian channel. We can
instead interpret a positive and significant coefficient of Camp as evidence in favor
of the labor market channel. As discussed in section 2, if the composition of current
fiscal policy matters for growth beyond its effect on agents' expectations that the
stabilization is successful, this could be because of the labor market channel.
The vector X2 includes the lagged value of the endogenous variable and of the
real per capita GDP-weighted growth rate of the G7 countries to control for the
world business cycle.
Equation (4) is estimated by OLS. However, since it includes a generated re-
gressor, Sit, the conventional standard errors of the estimated coefficients of the
variables in X2 and Xc are not consistent (unless 12 is statistically insignificant) .19
Therefore, any inference based on them would be incorrect. I correct the standard
errors following Murphy and Topel (1985). The correction allows Ulit and U2it to
be correlated.
19Soo Pagan (1984) and (1986). Note, however, that the coefficients estimates are consistent.
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3.2 Simultaneous equations approach
The single equation approach assumes that GDP growth influences governments'
ability to solve the fiscal imbalance only with a lag. If, instead, s* depends also
on current GDP growth, then there is a problem of simultaneity in the procedure
described in section 3.1. In fact, if s* and y are endogenous, estimates of the
effects of se on GDP growth without controlling for the effect of current growth
on s* are biased. To address this issue, I also estimate equations (5) and (6) below
simultaneously.
(5)
(6)
where [ Uti, 'IUJi'] I - N(O, n) and s and se are defined respectively by equations
(2) and (3) above.20
The coefficients 11 and 12 now take into account the contemporaneous effect
among s*, se and y. aI, ale, a2, and a2e measure the impact of the exogenous
201 am assuming that agents know current growth when they form their expectations on gov-
ernments' ability to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Alternatively, one can argue that agents do
not know the contemporaneous growth rate but they use the forecast data on GDP growth. In
this case, one introduces a forecast error in (6). The estimates are still consistent because the
estimation method allows for cross-equations correlation between the errors in (5) and (6).
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variables described in section 3.2.21
Because s* is a latent variable, I estimate equations (5) and (6) applying
Arnemiya's (1978) generalized least square technique (AGLS). Newey (1987) shows
that AGLS is asymptotically equivalent to the minimum X2 estimation procedure,
and that, in overidentified systems, AGLS is efficient relative to 2IV estimators. 22
The technical details of the AGLS procedure are given in appendix B.23
To estimate (5) and (6), the system needs to be identified. The identification
of the system requires that at least one exogenous variable in the equation for
8* is not included in the equation for growth and vice-versa. Given the results
of Alesina and Roubini (1997), who find no evidence that growth is permanently
different across types of governments, and because Size and Camp are on the rhs of
equation (6), the political variables do not enter the growth equation directly. Also,
I impose the restriction that the lagged value of the debt-tcrGDP ratio influence
21 In the equation for s", the interpretation of the coefficients of Comp and of the debt/GDP
ratio lagged one period are slightly different than in the single equation approach. They just
measure the direct effect of the two variables on the ability governments have to solve the fiscal
imbalance and not the effect that goes through GDP growth, given that Yit is on the rhs of
equation (5).
22 The system can be efficiently estimated by standard maximum likelihood methods. However,
the joint likelihood of the structural system for (5) and (6) would be extremely nonlinear. Thus,
in practice, it would be rather difficult to implement an MLE procedure.
23Londregan and Poole (1990) and Alesina et al. (1996) apply the same procedure to estimate
the relation between political instability and GDP growth.
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economic activity only indirectly through se. Similarly, I assume that the real per
capita GDP growth rate and the real per capita GDP-weighted growth rate of
the G7 countries both lagged one period influence governments' ability to stabilize
successfully only indirectly through their effect on current GDP growth.
Appendix B describes the statistics (22) I use to test the overidentifying re-
strictions of the system.
3.3 Sample choice, data, and definitions
Which is the "right" sample of country-years one should consider to estimate the
determinants of the different outcomes of the fiscal adjustments in the OECD
countries? There are two extreme choices: one is to consider all the OECD coun-
tries for the maximum time span for which data are available; the other is to
concentrate only on those episodes in which there is evidence of discretionary fis-
cal policy tightening.24 Both these choices present problems for the purpose of
this paper. Clearly, we do not observe substantial and discretionary deficit cuts
in country-years in which there is no concern for the state of public finance and
no need for fiscal austerity. In such circumstances, agents' expectations about the
governments' ability to solve the fiscal imbalance play no role. On the contrary,
information from country-years in which fiscal discipline is a problem, but govern-
ments do not undertake discretionary and substantial deficit cuts, is valuable to
24Previous research has identified episodes of fiscal adjustments using a variety of rules. One
could rely on these studies to select the episodes to consider in the sample.
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consumers and investors. Most likely, such inaction influences agents' expectations
about the stanre of future fiscal policy. Thus, including in the sample country-
years for which fiscal discipline is not an issue introduces noise that can bias the
estimate of 12 downward. One cannot distinguish between cases· in which a suc-
cessful stabilization is not observed because there is no need for it from those in
which a stabilization is needed but governments were not able to carry one out.
On the other hand, one loses valuable information by including in the sample only
those episodes in which there is evidence of discretionary and substantial tight
fiscal policy. To overcome these problems, a reasonable choice is to consider only
country-years in which there is a need for fiscal austerity.
The benchmark specification includes 19 OECD countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
the United States, from 1975 to 1996.25 This is the sample of countries considered
by previous research. In all the countries listed there has been one or more episodes
of fiscal consolidation,26 which is evidence that, at least during some years, fiscal
restraint was an issue of concern. As figure 1 shows, the average debt-to-GDP
ratio of the 19 OECD countries is almost constant in the sixties, decreases from
25Two small DEeD countries, Luxembourg and Iceland, are excluded, together with the new
members of this group admitted recently. New Zealand and Switzerland are excluded because of
data problems.
26See, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) for a list of episodes of fiscal adjustments.
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1968 to 1974, and rapidly increases afterward. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume
that countries became concerned about the state of public finance after the first
oil shock.27
Economic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook 1997. The political
data up to 1990 and for all countries except Greece, Portugal, and Spain are from
Budge, Keman, and Woldendrop (1993). Data for Greece, Portugal, and Spain,
as well as for the period 1990-1996 are from the Political Handbook of the World.
Appendix A contains the definition of the variables and some descriptive statistics.
Fiscal policy variables are cyclically adjusted with the method proposed by
Blanchard (1993). This leaves aside the changes in the fiscal variables induced
by business cycle fluctuations. It prevents the episodes of fiscal stabilizations as
selected by definition 1 below, and the size and the composition of fiscal policy
from reflecting economic growth rather than discretionary policy choices. The
cyclical correction calculates what the fiscal policy item would have been if the
unemployment rate were equal to that of the benchmark year. The discretionary
change of the fiscal policy variable is the difference between the cyclically adj listed
variable and the value of the variable in the previous year.28
27In section 5.1 I check that the results are robust to different sets of country-years included
in the sample.
28Many empirical papers on fiscal stabilizations use this method of cyclical adjustment. See
Alesina and Perotti (1995) for a detailed dffiCription of the method and for a discussion about
its advantages over the methods used by the OEeD and the IMF. Following Alesina and Perotti
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Before reviewing the data, we need to define more precisely the discrete variable
s that indicates whether or not governments undertake substantial cuts in the
deficit to GDP ratio and obtain, within a few years, a reduction in the debt as a
share of GDP (i.e. obtain a successful stabilization). The following definitions of
successful stabilizations rely on definitions used in previous studies.
Definition 1 A successful fiscal stabilization is an episode in which the cyclically
adjusted primary balance improves by at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP in one
year or by at least 1 percentage point of GDP in two consecutive years, and, two
years after, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 1.5 percentage points lower.29
The benchmark model uses definition 1. In section 5.2, I check the robustness
of the results using the following alternative definitions. First, I use a definition
identical to definition 1 except that I require that two years after the debt-to-GDP
(1995), this paper uses the previous year as the benchmark and cyclically adjustes all revenue
items as share of GDP and transfers as share of GDP. These variables are then used to construct
the cyclically adjusted primary deficit to GDP ratio.
291£ the fiscal stabilization takes place after 1994, it is not possible to determine whether the
episode is successful or not. The reason is that the OEeD data from the Economic Outlook 1997
end in 1996. To keep the information for 1995, I use the data for the debt and for GDP from
the Economic Outlook 1998 n.64. In this way, I am able to determine whether s = 1 or s = 0 for
the fiscal adjustments that took place in 1995. A fiscal adjustment/stabilization is an episode
that fulfills the first part of definition 1 (i.e. an episode in which the cyclically adjusted primary
balance improves by at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP in one year or by at least 1 percentage
point of GDP in two consecutive years).
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ratio is 1 percentage point lower (definition 2). Second, to lose fewer observations
at the end of the sample, I look at a shorter horizon. More specifically, I require
that the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.5 percentage point lower one year after the fiscal
stabilization (definition ;)). Finally, I define a successful stabilization' looking not
only at the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio but also at the dynamics of the
primary deficit. Thus, I define a successful stabilization as an episode in which two
years after either the debt-to-GDP ratio or the cyclically adjusted primary deficit
as a share of GDP is 1.5 percentage points lower (definition 4).30
4 Empirical results
4.1 Results from the single equation approach
Table 1 shows the results from the single equation approach discussed in section
3.1.
Results for equation (1) are in column 1. The size and the composition dummies
have a substantial effect on the likelihood of a successful stabilization. The average
probability that a government is able to solve the fiscal imbalance is 0.05 if the
30The definition of a successful stabilization relies on the change in the primary deficit adjusted
for the effect of the cycle because, for the purpose of this paper, one wants to consider the
macroeconomic effects of large and discretionary improvements in the budget balance that lead
to a sustainable level of the debt as a share of GDP. See section 3.1 for a more extensive discussion
of this point.
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adjustment is small (Size equals zero) and jumps to 0.28 if the adjustment is large
(Size equals one).31 The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. The
composition dummy has a lower, though still significant at 5%, impact than the
size dummy. If the change in primary spending-to-GDP ratio constitutes more than
50% of the improvement in primary balance as a share of GDP, the probability
that the government stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio increases by 12 percentage
points, from 0.04 to 0.16.
Contrary to what one might expect, the effect from past economic growth is
quite small. A 1% increase in GDP growth increases the probability that the
government is able to solve the fiscal imbalance by only 1 percentage point. Note,
however, that this specification considers just the impact of past economic activity
and neglects the feedback effects (addressed in section 4.2) that can exist between
s* and current growth.
Consider, next, the coefficient of the past level of the debt-to-GDP ratio: it
31 The effect from a change of a dummy variables from 0 to 1 is the difference between the
average probability calculated if the dummy variable equals zero and the average probability
calculated if the dummy variable is equal to one. I evaluate the average probability of success
using the coefficients of Table 1, column 1 and the data in the sample. To calculate the effect of
a 1% change in a continuous variable, I consider the difference between the average probability
of success using the coefficients of Table 1, column 1 and the data in the sample and the value
of this same variable calculated assuming that the continuous variable is 1% higher (or lower)
than in the actual data. I adopt this method throughout the paper. Alternatively, I could have
measured the probability evaluating it at the average value of the explanatory variables.
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is not statistically significant. This result, together with the evidence that lagged
GDP growth has a small positive effect on s*, casts doubts on the descriptive
evidence of previous studies and on the claim that successful fiscal adjustments
are more likely to occur when the economy reaches a crisis point.'
Interestingly, for a given size and composition of the fiscal package, left-wing
governments are more likely to stabilize the debt than right-wing ones. There is,
however, no evidence that a different type of government (majority versus coalition
governments) influences agents' expectations about the dynamics of the debt-to-
GDP ratio.32
Columns 2-5 show the results for the growth equation. First of all, the compo-
sition of fiscal policy has a very strong effect on GDP growth and is statistically
significant in all specifications at the 5% level. The economy booms (contracts)
when the change in primary spending-to-GDP ratio constitutes more than 50% of
the improvement (deterioration) in primary balance to GDP ratio. Real per capita
GDP grows at an average rate of 1.95%. The "right" fiscal policy-mix increases
growth by almost 33% from 1.95% to 2.59% (column 5). These numbers measure
the direct effect that Camp has on economic activity through the labor market
321 also found no evidence, that politicians engage in opportunistic, lax policiffi in election
years. Similarly, there seems to be no effect from the Maastricht Treaty on the likelihood of a
successful stabilization. These results (available upon request) are consistent with the evidence
given by Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alffiina and Roubini (1997), and Alffiina, Perotti, and
Tavafffi (1998).
36
channel. Second, the indirect effect of Comp through the expectation channel is
less than half the direct effect: the coefficient of se in the gTowth equation and the
one of Camp in the equation for se imply that GDP growth increases only by 13%
via the expectation channel if Comp changes from zero to one. Mo~e importantly,
this effect is not always statistically significant. In fact, the variable that measures
agents' expectations about the government's ability to successfully stabilize the
debt-to-GDP ratio, se, is statistically significant in column 3 and 4 when either
Size or Comp is excluded from the growth equation, but not in column 5 when
both are included.
Consider next the effect of the improvement in the primary balance on economic
activity. Bigger cuts in the primary deficit to GDP ratio do not have a statistically
significant effect on gTowth through the standard Keynesian channel. Size has
an effect only through the expectation channel in the specifications in which the
coefficient of se is statistically significant. Fiscal adjustments characterized by an
improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary balance-to-GDP ratio greater than
the average improvement over episodes of fiscal consolidations lead to an increase in
GDP growth by about 20%, from an average growth rate of 1.95% to 2.35%. Note
that this effect is larger than that the composition dummy has on growth through
the expectation channel, but smaller than that of Camp on growth through the
labor market channel. Hence, the results suggest that it is worth separating the
effects that Size and Comp have on economic activity through the two channels so
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as to conflate the importance of the different characteristics of the fiscal maneuver.
Table 2 extends the specifications in Table 1 by adding the country dummies.
Because equation (1) is estimated with a probit model, the effects that the ex-
planatory variables have on s· cannot be estimated for countries in which s does
not vary over time. For this reason, Austria, Germany, France, Greece, Japan, and
the Netherlands are not in the sample when the models are estimated with fixed
effects.
Results in Table 2 are similar to those in Table 1. Successful fiscal adjustments
depend primarily both on Size and Compo The probability that the consolidation
leads to a decrease of the debt-to-GDP ratio increases by 25 percentage points,
from 0.08 to 0.33, if Size equals one, and by 16 percentage points if Camp changes
from zero to one. The effect from lagged economic growth is smaller than in Table
1: a 1% increase in the growth rate of GDP increases the likelihood of the success
by 0.7 percentage points. Controlling for countries' fixed effects, the coefficient
of the past level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is statistically significant at the 5%
level. However, a 1% increase in the level of debt as a share of GDP increases
governments' ability to solve the fiscal imbalance by just one third of a percentage
point.
The evidence from the growth regression supports and strengthens the conclu-
sions about the importance of the labor market channel. In fact, the coefficient of
the variable that measures agents' expectations about the government's ability to
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successfully stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, se, is always statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, the impact that the composition variable has on growth through the
labor market channel is even stronger than in Table 1. Its coefficient is 0.009 with
a t-statistics of 2.99 (column 5), implying that real per capita GDP increases (de-
creases) by 46% if the change in primary spending-to-GDP ratio constitutes more
than 50% of the improvement (deterioration) in primary balance to GDP ratio.
In summary, the evidence suggests that:
i) the success of a fiscal adjustment is more likely if the improvement in the
primary balance-to-GDP ratio is large;
ii) the composition of the fiscal contraction matters for its success, whereas the
lagged GDP growth rate and the past level of the debt as a share of GDP playa
lesser role;
iii) the composition of the stabilization package is critical for GDP growth:
adding the positive effect that the composition variable has on growth through the
labor market channel and through the expectation channel, real per capita GDP
growth increases by 46% (Table 1, column 5) and by 54% (Table 2, column 5),
from an average growth rate of 1.95% to 2.84% and 3.01% respectively;
iv) the labor market channel seems to matter more than the expectation channel:
the variable that measures the public expectations about the success of the fiscal
adjustment is almost always statistically insignificant in the growth regressions.
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4.2 Results from the simultaneous equations approach
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimates from the simultaneous equations approach.
Country dummies are included in Table 4.
The impact of current real GDP growth on the likelihood of a successful sta-
bilization is larger than that of past economic growth shown in Table 1, but it is
still quite small in absolute terms. A 1% increase in real GDP growth increases
the ability of governments to solve the fiscal imbalance by 4 percentage points. 33
Note also that when country dummies are included in the regressions (Table 4),
current growth is not statistically significant for s·.
This evidence is important. Previous studies have been criticized precisely
because they failed to take into account the feedback effects from GDP growth on
the likelihood of a successful stabilization. Tables 3 and 4, instead, clearly show
that high economic growth does not drive the success of a consolidation and that,
controlling for current growth, the size and the composition variables still have
quite a large effect on s·. In fact, the average probability that the adjustment is
successful increases by 20 percentage points, from 0.07 to 0.27 if Size equals one,
and it increases from 0.07 to 0.15 when Camp changes from zero to one (Table 3).
It is also interesting that the effect of Camp is lower than that shown in Table
1. This may be because Table 3 explicitly controls for current growth. Thus, the
coefficient of Camp measures only how alternative fiscal policies (that are likely
33} use the coefficients of Table 3 column 3 to evaluate the average probability in this section.
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to have different degrees of persistence) influence s* through their effect on future
fiscal policies.
Results for the growth equation are in columns 2 and 4. They are virtually the
same as those shown in Table 1 and 2. First, the composition of the fiscal maneuver
strongly influences GDP growth. Fiscal adjustments that rely on substantial cuts
in primary spending rather than on sharp increases in taxes are associated with
high economic growth rates. Second, the evidence again supports the labor market
channel more than the expectation view. Once again, the coefficient of the variable
that measures agents' expectations about the government's ability to successfully
stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio is not significant in most specifications. This also
suggests that the size of the adjustment does not playa major role in explaining
expansionary fiscal contractions.
The last two rows of the tables show the value for the test statistics of the
overidentifying restrictions of the models and the corresponding p-values. In all
cases, the X2 test of the overidentifying restrictions does not reject the estimated
models at least at the 10% level of confidence.
4.3 The role of the policy mix
Fiscal stabilizations rarely happen in isolation. They are often part of broader
policy packages. Even in a standard IS-LM model, a fiscal contraction that is
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accompanied by an expansionary monetary policy can lead to a boom in the econ-
omy.
The specifications in Tables 1-4 do not control for the stance of monetary policy.
Suppose, for example, that the fiscal tightening is accompanied by a lax policy,
or that exchange rate devaluations systematically anticipate the fiscal adjustments
that turn out to be successful and expansionary. In this case, the coefficients of
Size and Camp can be biased capturing the effect of monetary rather than fiscal
policy. Previous research has been, of course, aware of this problem, but has
failed to address it. This paper explicitly controls for the stance of monetary and
exchange rate policies providing a further check that the conclusions reached so
far are sound.
As a rich literature has shown, the identification of exogenous indicators of the
monetary policy stance is not a trivial issue, even for a country like the US, where
data availability on monetary aggregates is not a problem.34 In a cross-country
analysis, one is definitely constrained by data availability and comparability in
choosing indicators for the stance of monetary policy. Tables 5 and 6, thus, include
as regressors in the equation for GDP growth lagged values of the rate of growth
of M2, of the change in the short-term nominal interest rate, and of the rate of
growth of the nominal exchange rate.35 Table 6 controls for countries' fixed effects.
34See, for instance, Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
35The contemporaneous values of the money growth rate, of the change of the nominal short
term interest rate, and of the nominal exchange rate growth are more likely to be endogenous
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Column 2 of Tables 5 and 6 show that an increase in money growth has a
positive and significant effect on output growth. Similarly, a decrease in the short-
term nominal interest rate increases GDP growth, and the coefficient on the interest
rate variable is statistically significant at the 5% level (column 4). In contrast,
there is no evidence that changes in the nominal exchange rate have a statistical
significant effect on economic activity (column 6, Tables 5 and 6).
There is mixed evidence in the literature on the link between fiscal consolida-
tions and exchange rate devaluations. Some studies present evidence that stronger
devaluations anticipate some expansionary fiscal adjustments. Bradley and Whe-
lan (1997), for example, claim that the increase in export due to the devaluation
of the nominal exchange rate determined the boom during the Irish stabilization
in 1987-1989. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) show that devaluations are important
elements of the policy package, but that devaluations alone are not sufficient to
drive a boom in the economy. Alesina et al. (1999) find instead that on average
the contribution from net export to GDP growth decreases during expansionary
fiscal contractions. Hence, they find no evidence to link the boom in the economy
to a surge in exports. If exchange rate devaluations occurred, their results suggest
that on average these devaluations had no positive effect on the real economy.
in the GDP growth equation than their lagged. values. Moreover, it can also take time for such
changes to affect the real economy. For these reasons, I include the lagged. values of the above
variables in the growth equation. However, results are similar if the contemporaneous value of
the variables are used.
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The estimates of Tables 5 and 6, column 6, lead to a similar conclusion: exchange
rate devaluations do not have a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP
growth.36
Clearly, this paper is not concerned with whether or not monetary policy affects
the economy. What matters here is that the coefficients of Size and Camp do not
capture the impact of monetary rather than fiscal policy. Note that in Tables 5
and 6 the coefficients of Size, Camp, Growth, and se and their t-statistics are close
to those in Tables 3 and 4. This is true regardless of the variable used to control
for the stance of monetary policy. Hence, this paper finds no evidence that lax
monetary policy and exchange rate devaluations drive successful and expansionary
fiscal contractions.
5 Sensitivity analysis
The results shown in section 4 are robust to a variety of specifications. This
section discusses several extensions of the benchmark model. Unless otherwise
specified, I present the results from the simultaneous equations approach and I
use the specification in Table 3, columns 3 and 4. This specification does not
control for country fixed effects. A5 discussed in section 4.1, including country
dummies in the estimation reduces the number of countries that can be used. In
some specifications that follow, one is left with too few observations to be able to
36 A positive growth rate of the nominal exchange rate describes an appreciation of the currency.
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estimate the parameters of the system.
5.1 Alternative specifications of the sample
Results are robust to alternative specifications of the sample of country-years in
which there is need for fiscal austerity. I estimate the benchmark model using the
following rules. First, I include in the sample only the observations for which the
debt-to-GDP ratio lagged one year is greater than the median value in the country
(Table 7, columns 1 and 2). Second, I select all those observations for which the
primary spending-to-GDP ratio lagged one year is greater than the median value
in the country (Table 7, columns 3 and 4). Finally, I consider all the observations
for which the growth rate of the debt as a share of GDP lagged one year is greater
than the median value in the country (Table 7, columns 5 and 6).
Compared with the estimates of Table 3, the coefficient of the variable se is
now statistically insignificant. A different size and composition of the stabilization
package does not influence GDP growth thereby changing agents' expectations
about the stance of future fiscal policy. The coefficients of all the other variables
are close to those in Table 3.
These results are important beyond the fact that they show that the above
conclusions are not sensitive to the choice of the sample. They also provide ev-
idence against the claim that successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are
more likely to happen in "bad times". The average probability that the fiscal ad-
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justment leads to a success is 9% in the benchmark model (Table 3). Restricting
the sample to country-years with high initial level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, of the
primary spending-to-GDP ratio, and of the growth rate of the debt as a share of
GDP, the average probability of a successful stabilization becomes 11, 11, and 10%
respectively. Also, the effect that Camp has on GDP growth in the three different
samples in Table 7 is similar to that in Table 3.
Results (not shown) are also robust selecting the sample with the same three
rules as above, but using as benchmark the median value of the debt-to-GDP ratio,
of the primary spending-to-GDP ratio, and of growth rate of the debt as a share
of GDP of all the countries in the sample.
5.2 Alternative definitions of successful stabilizations
Table 8 is the same as Table 3 (columns 3 and 4) except that it considers definitions
2, 3, and 4 of the variable s.
In Table 8, columns 3 and 5, contemporaneous GDP growth has no statistically
significant effect on governments' ability to solve the fiscal imbalance, contrary to
the results in Table 3, column 3. The results concerning the other explanatory
variables both of the equation for s* and of the equation for yare, instead, similar
to those in Table 3. Thus, the conclusions reached so far do not depend on the
definition of s.
46
5.3 Alternative indicators of the fiscal policy stance
5.3.1 Alternative measures of the fiscal policy composition
It is crucial to check that the specification of the fiscal policy variables is not driving
the results. Tables 9 and 10 are the same as Table 3 except for the variable that
measures the fiscal policy composition. Comp(b) is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if more than 50% of the improvement in the primary balance is due to a cut
in primary spending and zero otherwise (Table 9). Comp(c) is a semi-continuous
variable equal to the proportion of the improvement in the primary balance due
to the change in primary spending and zero otherwise. To avoid problems with
extremely high values that the variable Comp(c) can take when both spending and
taxes are cut, I set Comp(c) equal to one if the ratio takes a value greater than
one (Table 8).
Results in Tables 9 and 10 are close to those in Table 3.37 Thus, the conclusions
from section 4 are not sensitive to the specification of the variable that measures
the fiscal policy composition.
It is also interesting to investigate whether the choice of spending and revenue
items has an impact on the endogenous variables. In fact, according to the theory
37Results are the same excluding the observations in which the ratio takes extreme high values.
See also section 3.1.1 for why it is not possible to estimate the effect of the fiscal policy composition
when the primary balance to GDP ratio deteriorates separately from the effect of the fiscal policy
composition when the primary balance-to-GDP ratio improves.
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that considers the effects of fiscal policy on the economy through the labor market,
the composition of the spending and revenue changes is fundamental. Changes in
governments wages, government employment, and labor taxation should have a
stronger effect on the economy than changes in other spending and revenue items.
Table 11 addresses this point. Two dummy variables, Dew and Dlabtax, that
measure the composition of the spending and revenue changes are included on
the rhs of equation (5) and (6). Dew is equal to one if more than 20% of the
reduction in primary spending is due to cuts in the government wage bill, minus
one if more than 20% of the increase in primary spending is due to increases in the
government wage bill, and zero otherwise. The average change of the government
wage bill over the average change in primary spending is 20% during episodes of
fiscal adjustments. Dlabtax is equal to one if more than 30% of the reduction in
total revenue is due to cuts in labor taxes, minus one if more than 30% of the
increase in total revenue is due to increases in labor taxes, and zero otherwise. 38
The average change of labor taxes over the average change in total revenue is 30%
during episodes of fiscal adjustments. A positive coefficient of the variable Dew
hence suggests that fiscal adjustments in which government wages are a substantial
share of the reduction of the primary spending are more likely to be successful
and expansionary. On the contrary, a positive coefficient of the variable Dlabtax
suggests that fiscal adjustments in which a substantial increase in total revenue
38Labor taxes are the sum of direct taxes on households and social security contributions. See
also appendix A.
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comes from the increase in labor taxation are more likely to be unsuccessful and
contractionary.
Results in Table 11, columns 2 and 4, show that GDP growth is higher if
government wages and labor taxes are reduced and if they represent a consistent
share of the reduction of primary spending and total revenue, respectively. Adding
together the direct effects from Camp and Dew and Camp and Dlabtax, the "right"
composition of fiscal policy increases growth by 45% and 36% respectively.
In contrast, Dew and Dlabtax do not have a statistically significant effect on
governments' ability to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. This suggests that Dew
and Dlabtax influence the economy through the labor market channel, not through
the expectation channel.
Interestingly, and consistently with the evidence by Alesina et al. (1999) on
business investments, the coefficient of Dew is greater than the coefficient of Dlab-
tax in the equation for GDP growth. Reductions in government wages have larger
expansionary effects than cuts in labor taxes.
5.3.2 Nonlinear effects from changes in primary balance
Let us now check if the change in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio still has a
nonlinear effect on governments' ability to solve the fiscal imbalance and on GDP
growth if we replace the variable Size with the change in the primary balance as
a share of GDP and its square. This is done in Tables 12,13, and 14. Apart from
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this, Table 12 is the same as Table 3; Tables 13 and 14 also consider the effect
from the composition of the changes of spending and revenue items as in section
5.3.1.
Results for the s· equation are in columns 1 and 3. The likelihood of a suc-
cessful stabilization depends positively on both the change in the primary balance
and its square, and the coefficients of both variables are significant at the 5% level.
Compared with the estimates of Table 3, the composition of the fiscal policy pack-
age has no direct effect on s·, but only an indirect one, through its effect on current
CDP growth.
Columns 2 and 4 show the estimates for the growth equation. Both the change
in the primary balance and its square are not statistically significant in the equa-
tion for CDP growth. Hence, as in Table 3, the size of the adjustment does not
have a direct effect on GDP growth. It does not even have an indirect effect, since
the coefficient of the variable se is not statistically significant except in Table 14,
column 4. As far as the effect that the composition of the stabilization package
has on economic activity through the labor market channel, the conclusions from
the benchmark model hold. In fact, when the change in the primary balance and
its square are excluded from the growth regression (column 4), the variables that
measure the composition of fiscal policy are all statistically significant at the 5%
level (except the variable Dlabtax whose t-statistics is 1.64) and the magnitude of
the coefficients is even larger than in Table 3. When the change in the primary bal-
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ance and its square are included in the growth regression (column 2), the variable
Comp is not statistically significant. However, observe that the variables Dew and
Dlabtax are still statistically significant and that their coefficients are close to the
ones in Table 11. As argued above, labor taxes and wage government consumption
are those items of the budget that should have a greater impact on growth via
their impact on labor costs, firms' profitability, and private investment.
Finally, results in Table 12 are virtually unchanged if one replaces the variable
Comp with the semi-continuous variable Comp(e) defined in section 5.3.1.
5.4 Alternative functional form specification
In both equations (4) and (6) GDP growth depends on agents' expectations about
the government's ability to implement a successful stabilization, se. Alternatively,
one can test whether agents' expectations about the probability that the govern-
ment will solve the country's fiscal imbalance affect the growth rate of output. In
this case, equation (7) defines se, replacing equation (3):
(7)
where cI> is the standard normal distribution function.
We can easily estimate this alternative specification in the single equation ap-
proach. Results are given in Table 15, which is the same as Table 1 except for the
definition of se. Column 1 reports the estimates for equation (1) from Table 1.
Columns 2-5 show the results for the growth equation. The evidence is consistent
51
with the conclusions reached so far. If anything, there is greater evidence against
the significance of the expectation channel. The coefficient of the variable se is not
statistically significant in the equation for growth even when either Size or Camp
is excluded from the regression.
5.5 Centralized versus decentralized labor markets
Does the composition of fiscal policy affect the economy differently across countries
with different types of labor markets? Alesina and Perotti (1997) find evidence of
a hump-shaped relation between changes in labor taxation and changes in compet-
itiveness. When the labor market is close to competitive, increases in labor taxes
are borne almost entirely by the workers with little or no effect on firms' labor
costs. As unions become more powerful, they are able to obtain increases in the
wage rate in response to an increase in taxation, leading to higher unit labor costs
and lower firms' profitability and competitiveness. However, at very high levels of
centralization of the labor market, unions become so large that they can internal-
ize the government budget constraint and the costs from higher wages. Therefore,
they moderate their wage claims, and a given increase in taxation induces a lower
increase in unit labor costs than in a more decentralized labor market. Daveri
and Tabellini also find similar results on the effect of taxation on growth and
unemployment.
This section examines whether the effect of fiscal policy composition OIl GDP
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growth is different in more/less centralized labor markets. Countries are grouped
using the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) index, which ranks Austria, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, France, United
Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the United States, and Canada in descending order of
centralization. Following Alesina and Perotti (1997), I divide these countries in
different groups. C is a dummy variable equal to one in the group of centralized
countries and zero otherwise; I is a dummy variable equal to one in the group
of countries with intermediate degree of centralization and zero otherwise; D is
a dummy variable equal to one in the group of the decentralized countries and
zero otherwise. Finally, 0 is a dummy variable equal to one for Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain, and zero otherwise.39 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 16 group
the first five countries ranked by Calmfors and Driffill in the C group, the second
five in I, the third five in D. The classification in columns 3 and 4 differs from the
previous one because it includes Italy among the countries with an intermediate
level of centralization of the labor market rather than among the decentralized
countries. Columns 5 and 6, instead, adopt a classification ahnost identical to the
one used by Alesina and Perotti (1997b).40
39These countries are not ranked by Calmfors and Driffill, but belong to the sample of the
countries used in this paper.
40 Alesina and Perotti (1997b) include Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland in the C group,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium in the I group, and Canada, the United States, Japan,
Italy, United Kingdom, France, and Australia in the D group. Columns 5 and 6 also include
Austria in the C group. Greece, Ireland, and Spain belong to the 0 group.
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Across all three classifications, the composition of fiscal policy has no direct
effect on GDP growth in the countries with the most centralized labor markets: the
variable C*Comp is not statistically significant. On the contrary, both the variables
I*Comp and D*Comp are statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, the direct
effect of the fiscal policy composition on GDP growth is nil in the countries with
the most centralized labor markets, and increases as the degree of centralization
decreases. In columns 2, 4, and 6, the coefficient of the variable I*Comp is slightly
higher than that of D*Comp. However, the difference between the two coefficients
is not statistically significant. Thus, the paper finds no evidence of a hump-shaped
relation between the degree of centralization of the labor market (with the strongest
effect occurring in countries with intermediate levels of centralization) and the
effect of the fiscal policy composition on economic activity. This result is consistent
with the evidence by OECD (1997).
5.6 Components of growth: private consumption and pri-
vate investment
Do fiscal adjustments affect private consumption and private investment through
different channels? Is the expectation channel less important than the labor market
channel also in explaining the reactions of private consumption and private invest-
ment to fiscal stabilization packages? An exhaustive answer to these questions
requires a proper specification of the consumption and investment functions. This
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is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. In this section,
I use the methodology described in section 3.2 and replace the contemporaneous
real per capita growth rate with the real per capita private consumption growth
rate (Table 17), and the real private investment growth rate (Table 18).
Interestingly, private consumption and private investment react to the fiscal
policy composition in a substantially different manner. On average, real private
investment grows at a rate of 2.25%, and real per capita private consumption at a
rate of 1.86%. The rate of growth of private investment more than doubles if fiscal
policy has the "right" composition. It goes from 2.25% to 5.05%. The increase of
private consumption is, instead, much smaller, from 1.86% to 2.46%. This result
is consistent with Alesina et al. (1999), who show that the composition of fiscal
policy is a crucial determinant for business investments.
6 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the determinants of the different macroeconomic outcomes
observed during and a few years after many episodes of fiscal consolidations in the
GEeD countries. The evidence suggests that the driving channel for expansionary
fiscal adjustments is the effect that fiscal policy has on the labor market, the cost
side and the profitability of the firms. The variables measuring the composition of
current fiscal policy have, in fact, a sizable impact on GDP growth through this
channel. Agents' expectations about the future stance of fiscal policy, instead, do
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not matter as much in explaining the response of the economy. These results hold
controlling for the stance of monetary policy and for exchange rate devaluations.
The paper also shows that the probability that the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases
within a few years after the stabilization depends largely on the size of the adjust-
ment. The composition of the fiscal package is also important, whereas current
GDP growth does not drive the success of the stabilization.
The paper leaves open some important issues for future research. For instance,
it does not study the behavior of interest rates and financial markets around the
time of the fiscal adjustments. The latter may be another way of capturing credi-
bilityjexpectations effects. In fact, Balduzzi, Corsetti, and Foresi (1997) show that
interest rates react differently according to the expectations agents have about the
type of the fiscal policy change. Moreover, the relation between fiscal policy and
various economic policies implemented together with the fiscal contractions cer-
tainly deserves further investigation. The paper focuses only on the role played
by monetary policy. Income policies, structural reforms of the labor market, and
privatization can all be part of the policy package and can influence the outcome
of the stabilization as well. Whether or not the policy-mix and structural reforms
are fundamental to explaining successful and expansionary fiscal contractions is an
interesting question for future work.
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7 Appendix A: Data
Economic data are from the OEeD Economic Outlook 1997 data set, n.62.
Debt = government gross debt.
Primary expenditure = transfers+government consumption + public invest-
ment + subsidies.
Government wages = wage government consumption.
Revenue = direct taxes on households+direct taxes on business+indirect taxes+social
security contributions received by the government+other current transfers received
by the government.
Labor taxes = direct taxes on households + social security contributions.
Tran *= cyclically adjusted transfer as a share of GDP as in Alesina and Perotti
(1995).
Rev* = cyclically adjusted revenue as a share of GDP as in Alesina and Perotti
(1995).
Primary cyclically adjusted balance/GDP = (Tran*)+((government consump-
tion+public investment+subsidies-government consumption of fixed capital-net
capital transfers received by the governrnent41 )jGDP)-(Rev*). After 1970, other
41 In each year, the following data are missing: a) government consumption of fixed capital
(efgk) for France, United Kingdom and Portugal; b) net capital transfer received by the govern-
ment (Ktrrg) for Norway; c) government consumption of fixed capital and net capital transfer
received by the government for Greece. For these countries, the variables corresponding to the
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payments made and received by the governments, (variables YPEPG and YPERG)
are also considered in the definition of the primary deficit and interest payments
are excluded.
Growth = growth rate of real per capita GDP.
Growth (G7) = average growth rate of real per capita GDP (with GDP weights)
of the seven major industrial countries.
Size = 1 if the improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary balance over
GDP is greater than the average improvement over episodes of fiscal stabilizations
as in definition 1, 0 otherwise.
Comp= 1 if more than 50% of the improvement In the cyclically adjusted
primary balance is due to the reduction in cyclically adjusted spending, -1 if the
more than 50% of the deterioration in the cyclically adjusted primary balance is
due to the increase in cyclically adjusted spending, 0 otherwise.
Comp(b)= 1 if more than 50% of the improvement in the cyclically adjusted
primary balance is due to the reduction in cyclically adjusted spending, 0 otherwise.
Comp(e)= ratio of the change in the primary cyclically adjusted spending as a
share of GDP to the change of the primary cyclically adjusted balance as a share
of GDP if the primary cyclically adjusted balance to GDP ratio improves and 0
otherwise.
Dew = 1 if more than 20% of the reduction in primary spending is due to cuts in
missing data are not included in the equation for the primary cyclically adjusted deficit.
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the government wage bill, -1 if more than 20% of the increase in primary spending
is due to increases in the government wage bill, 0 otherwise. 20% represents the
average change of the government wage bill over the average change in primary
spending during episodes of fiscal adjustments.
Dlabtax = 1 if more than 30% of the reduction in total revenue is due to cuts in
labor taxes, -1 if more than 30% of the increase in total revenue is due to increases
in labor taxes, 0 otherwise. 30% represents the average change of labor taxes over
the average change in total revenue during episodes of fiscal adjustments.
Exch = rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate. A minus sign
corresponds to a devaluation of the currency.
%~M2 = rate of growth of M2.
Interest rate = Short term interest rate.
)
~Interest rate = Short term interest rate (t) -Short term interest rate (t-1) .
Maastricht =1 for countries in the ED after 1992, 0 otherwise.
Political data up to 1990 and for all countries except Greece, Portugal and
Spain are from Budge, Kernan and Woldendrop (1993). Data for Greece, Portugal
and Spain, as well as for the period 1990-1996 are from the Political Handbook of
the World.
Majority = 1 if the government in office during the year is a majoritarian
government. The classification is from Budge, Kernan and Woldendrop (1993). If
there are changes of government during the year, the type of the government is
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determined by the government in office for the highest number of months.
Left = 1 if the government in office during the year is a left government. The
classification is from Budge, Kernan and Woldendrop (1993). If there are changes
of government during the year, the type of the government is determined by the
government in office for the highest number of months.
Centre= 1 if the government in office during the year is a centre government.
The classification is from Budge, Kernan and Woldendrop (1993). If there are
changes of government during the year, the type of the government is determined
by the government in office for the highest number of months.
Election= 1 if there is an election during the year, 0 otherwise.
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8 Appendix B
8.1 Simultaneous equations approach
Consider the model in section 3.2. The model is described by the following system
of structural equations:
1 if sit ~ 0
Sit = {
ootherwise
and
where
where:
-i={l, ,I} indicates the countries in the sample;
-t={I, ,T} indicates the annual observation;
-sit, S~t, and Yit are scalars
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(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
-Xlit,Xcit, and X2it are 1 X kI, 1 x ke , 1 X k2 . Xeit, are common to both equations.
- [ Uti, U2it]" N(O, fl)
11' 12 are scalars and aI, a2, ale, a2e are k I X 1, k2 X 1, and k e X 1 vectors of
parameters to estimate42 •
Equations (9) and (8) are jointly estimated applying Amemiya's (1978) general-
ized least square technique (AGLS). Newey, (1987), shows that AGLS is asymptoti-
cally equivalent to the minimum X2 estimation procedure and that, in overidentified
systems, it is efficient relative to 2IV estimators.
The procedure requires estimating the reduced form of the system in the first
42Rewriting equation (11) as (12)
(12)
and substituting it in (9), I can rewrite equations (9) and (8) as (14) and (13) below
(13)
(14)
where:
-U2it = U2it - 12Ulit
-Ulit, U2it are bivariate normal errors, with zero mean and variance covariance matrix S1.
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step. The reduced form of the above system can be written as
(15)
(16)
where:
-Xit is a 1 X k vector consisting of the column vectors in Xlit, Xcit and X2it;
-7[1 and 7[2 are respectively k x 1 vectors equal to 7[1 = [ 7[II 7[Ie 7[12] Iand
7[2 = [ 7[21 7[2e 7[22r
- Vlit, V2it are norm[a;Y d:::i]buted[~ith ::~]zero and variance covariance
matrix given by E = 2 2 where the variance of Vlit is
a12 a 2 pa 2 a 2
normalized to one, p is the correlation between Vlit and V2it, and a~ is the variance
of V2it. Without normalizing the variance of Vlit to one, one can identify 7fl only
up to a scalar multiple because S;t is a dichotomous variable.
The reduced form parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The
density function for the reduced form system is given by equation (17), in which
the indexes it have been suppressed.
<p (v) (27[)-1 1E 1-1 exp { -~VE-Iv'} = (17)
= (27[0"2)-1 (1 - p2r' exp { 20"~ (11_ p2) (v~ - 2p0"2V I V2 + O"M) }
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Adding and subtracting V~p2, (17) can be rewritten as (18)
¢(V) - (21r1T2)-l (1 - p2f' exp { 21TH11_ p2) (vHl - p2) + (1T2Vl - PV2)2) } = (18)
- (21rIT~f' exp { - 2~~ v~ } (21rr~ (1 - p2ft exp { 2 (1 ~ p2) (Vl - :2 112r} =
= fV2fvl
Thus, the likelihood function of the reduced form system can be factored into
the product of two likelihood functions: the first one corresponding to the growth
equation, (16), and the second one being the likelihood function of a probit model
corresponding to equation (15). Equation (19) describes the log-likelihood function
of the reduced form system:
where ¢ and <I> are the standard normal density and distribution functions
respectively. Maximizing (19) with respect to ('if1, 'if2, p, 0"2) gives the estimates of
the parameters of the reduced form system43 •
43Londregan and Poole, (1990), indicate the steps required to obtain the reduced form param-
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The standard procedure to obtain the structural parameters from the reduced
form ones is to use the minimum X2 estimation procedure. Newey establishes that
doing GLS on the equation
i)* = D*b +", (20)
is an equivalent procedure to the minimum X2 estimation, where:
-fJo = [ 1ri' 1r;']' is a 2k x 1 vector of the estimates from the reduced form
system;
-Do = [ :; :i Ik1 I"'] matrix with: 0 are conformable matrices of zeros;
I k1 and I k2 are k X (k1 + kc ) and k X (k2 + kc ) submatrices of a 2k X 2k identity
eters. Summarizing:
-the estimates for 71"2 are obtained by the OL8 estimation of equation (16);
-the estimates for 71"1 are obtained. estimating a probit specification on equation (15) where the
residuals from the OL8 estimation on equation (16) are added as regressors, (faling to add the
residuals from the OLS equation to equation (15) would result in inefficient estimates because
71"1 would be obtained maximizing a marginal rather than a conditional likelihood). Coefficients
obtained from this regression are corrected to consider the difference in the arguments of the
likelihood function estimated in this step and in the arguments of the likelihood function in (19).
-the formula for variance covariance matrix for the reduced form estimates, denote it C, is
from Newey (1987) pag. 242.
Londregan and Poole, (1990), estimate it via Efron's bootstrap techinique, with 1,024 replica-
tions. I have tried both methods. Results are very close and the formula from Newey is used for
practical convenience.
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matrix 12k , such that 1k1 consists of the columns from 1 through (k1 + ke ) of 12k ,
and 1k2 consists of the columns from k + k1 + 1 through 2k of 12k44;
-8 = ["VI "V a' a' a' a']' is the vector of the parameters of the struc-/ /2 1 Ie 2e 2
tural system.
The variance covariance matrix of the GLS estimates from (20) is consistently
estimated by:
(21)
where \II is a consistent estimator for the variance covariance matrix of the
errors in (20) 45.
Restrictions in the overidentified model can be tested. Let pred (iJ*) be the
predicted value from the GLS regression on (20), then
44The matrix D* embodies the restrictions between the reduced form and the structural form
coefficients.
45 A consistent estimator for the variance covariance matrix of the errors in (20) is given by the
following expression
where
[
1
r*=
-/2
and Ii, /2 are the OLS estimators on (20) for the parameters of the structural system. See
Londregan and Poole (1990) and Newey (1987).
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[pred (79*) - 79*]' 0- 1 [pred (79*) - 79*] (22)
has a X2 distribution with degree of freedom equal to the number of overiden-
tifying restrictions imposed on the mode146 •
46Full maximum likelihood estimation of the structural parameters of the system provides an
alternative efficient estimation method, but this approach is computationally more complicated.
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Table 1: Success and Growth: single equation approach-benchmark model
Dependent variables s* Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
S· 0.0071 0.0031 0.0027
(3.88) (1.77) (1.20)
Growth (t-l) 11.59 0.26 0.16 0.22 0.23
(1.98) (5.15) (2.41) (3.82) (3.75)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.15
(1.88) (2.30) (2.00) (2.00)
Size 1.48 0.0059 -0.0037 0.0017
(4.62) (1.46) (-0.68) (0.33)
Comp 0.94 0.009 0.006 0.0064
(4.02) (6.43) (2.46) (2.39)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.64
(1.36)
Left government 0.73
(2.70)
Centre government -0.71
(-1.27)
Majority government -0.20
(-0.73)
Constant -2.84 0.011 0.029 0.020 0.018
(-6.35) (7.48) (6.78) (4.64) (3.28)
N. of observations 390 390 390 390 390
R2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
Probit specification in column 1. OLS regressions in column 2-5. T-statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors
of the estimates in columns 3-5 have been corrected following Murphy and Topel (1985). Success as in
definition 1. Growth is real per capita GDP growth rate. See appendix A for variables' definitions.
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Table 2: Success and Growth: single equation approach-benchmark model
Dependent variables s· Growth
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
go 0.0049 0.0011 0.001
(3.80) (0.85) (0.72)
Growth (t-I) 7.64 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.27
(0.96) (4.60) (3.09) (4.36) (4.32)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.08
(0.78) (1.48) (0.91) (0.91)
Size 1.79 0.002 -0.0042 0.0001
(3.79) (0.44) (-0.74) (0.03)
Comp 1.37 0.011 0.0091 0.0092
(3.97) (6.30) (3.16) (3.05)
Debt/GDP (t-1) 3.58
(2.62)
Left government 0.69
(1.57)
Centre government -0.99
(-1.03)
Majority government 0.76
(1.07)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N. ofobservations 266 266 266 266 266
R2 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58
See Table 1.
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Table 3: Success and Growth: simultaneous equations approach-benchmark model
Dependent variables s· Growth s· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S· 0.0029 0.0034
(l.48) (2.09)
Growth 35.99 36.13
(1.93) (1.94)
Growth (t-l) 0.23 0.22
(4.59) (4.51)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.14 0.14
(1.89) (2.08)
Size 1.22 0.001 1.26
(3.65) (0.32) (4.05)
Comp 0.65 0.006 0.64 0.0056
(2.29) (2.43) (2.28) (2.39)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.63 0.63
(1.42) (1.50)
Left government 0.76 0.75
(2.64) (2.76)
Centre government -0.41 -0.35
(-0.81) (-0.76)
Majority government -0.13 -0.10
(-0.47) (-0.41)
Constant -3.37 0.019 -3.38 0.02
(-5.80) (3.53) (-5.91) (4.81)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 3.71 4.33X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.45 0.50
Simultaneous equations approach. Estimation by AGLS technique. T-statistics in parenthesis. Success as in
definition 1. Growth is real per capita GDP growth rate. See appendix A for variables' definitions.
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Table 4: Success and Growth: simultaneous equations approach-benchmark model
Dependent variables S· Growth S· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S· 0.0012 0.0013
(0.93) (1.09)
Growth 22.26 21.68
(0.72) (0.70)
Growth (t-l) 0.30 0.30
(4.91) (4.89)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.01 0.02
(0.11 ) (0.19)
Size 1.28 -0.0001 1.28
(2.03) (-0.02) (2.09)
Comp 0.98 0.0089 1.00 0.0089
(1.68) (3.06) (1.71) (3.14)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 2.95 2.91
(1.85) (1.82)
Left government 0.52 0.54
(0.90) (0.93)
Centre government -0.90 -0.86
(-0.73) (-0.69)
Majority government 0.69 0.73
(0.72) (0.74)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
N. of observations 266 266
2 'd 5.65 5.73X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.23 0.33
See Table 3.
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Table 5: Success and Growth-the policy-mix
Dependent variables s* Growth s* Growth s* Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S- 0.004 0.002 0.003
(2.24) (1.23) (2.09)
Growth 27.85 31.51 35.92
(1.50) (2.36) (1.93)
Growth (t-l) 0.22 0.25 0.22
(4.59) (5.37) (4.45)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.13 0.21 0.14
(1.92) (3.03) (2.11 )
%~M2 (t-l) 0.02
(1.83)
~Interest rate (t-l) -0.32
(-6.80)
Exch (t-l) 0.003
(0.21)
Size 1.18 1.36 1.26
(3.70) (4.10) (4.06)
Comp 0.67 0.0054 0.65 0.005 0.64 0.0056
(2.28) (2.20) (2.48) (2.20) (2.28) (2.38)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.70 0.65 0.62
(1.68) (1.46) (1.51)
Left government 0.78 0.77 0.75
(2.91) (2.77) (2.78)
Centre government -0.26 -0.25 -0.34
(-0.58) (-0.49) (-0.75)
Majority government -0.11 -0.06 -0.09
(-0.43) (-0.21) (-0.39)
Constant -3.18 0.018 -3.38 0.015 -3.38 0.020
(-5.70) (4.48) (-6.15) (3.37) (-5.92) (4.74)
N. of observations 389 374 390
2 'd 9.23 5.69 4.61X test: oven. restr.
p-value 0.16 0.46 0.59
See Table 3.
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Table 6: Success and Growth-the policy-mix
Dependent variables s· Growth s· Growth s· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S- 0.002
-0.0008 0.001
(2.02) (-0.57) (1.10)
Growth 18.85 16.32 22.18
(0.64) (0.97) (0.71)
Growth (t-1) 0.26 0.35 0.30
(4.40) (5.74) (4.89)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.008 0.07 0.01
(0.09) (0.72) (0.14)
%~M2 (t-l) 0.05
(2.19)
~Interest rate (t-1) -0.40
(-6.87)
Exch (t-l)
-0.009
(-0.38)
Size 1.37 1.31 1.29
(2.20) (2.18) (2.09)
Comp 1.07 0.007 0.85 0.008 0.98 0.009
(1.92) (2.60) (1.69) (2.81) (1.66) (3.01)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 2.74 3.59 2.88
(1.69) (2.31) (1.79)
Left government 0.68 0.36 0.53
(1.19) (0.68) (0.91)
Centre government -0.67 -1.34 -0.91
(-0.55) (-1.28) (-0.68)
Majority government 0.87 0.47 0.71
(0.89) (0.55) (0.72)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N. of observations 266 250 266
2 'd 7.55 14.52 5.67X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.27 0.02 0.46
See Table 3.
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Table 7: Success and Growth-alternative specifications of the sample
(A) (B) (C)
Dependent variables s* Growth S* Growth s* Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S· 0.002 0.003 0.002
(1.17) (1.67) (1.02)
Growth 38.27 37.36 35.18
(2.44) (2.30) (1.94)
Growth (t-l) 0.22 0.27 0.14
(4.07) (5.25) (2.18)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.41 0.16 0.36
(5.32) (2.22) (4.41)
Size 1.80 1.36 1.35
(4.59) (4.24) (3.85)
Comp 0.52 0.005 0.62 0.0059 0.43 0.005
(1.99) (2.19) (2.25) (2.46) (1.66) (2.13)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.76 0.54 1.06
(1.49) (1.24) (1.76)
Left government 0.76 0.68 0.67
(2.44) (2.54) (2.15)
Centre government -0.31 -0.24 -0.26
(-0.59) (-0.51) (-0.44)
Majority government -0.08 -0.04 0.15
(-0.26) (-0.15) (0.48)
Constant -3.59 0.013 -3.33 0.018 -3.63 0.017
(-5.07) (2.96) (-5.85) (4.21) (-4.57) (3.82)
N. ofobservations 265 304 280
2 'd 4.63 7.15 10.14X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.46 0.21 0.07
See Table 3. (A) includes in the sample only the observations for which the debt-to-GDP ratIo lagged one
year is greater than the median value in the country. (B) includes in the sample only the observations for
which the primary spending-to-GDP ratio lagged one year is greater than the median value in the country .
(C) includes in the sample only the observations for which the growth rate of the debt as a share ofGDP
lagged one year is greater than the median value in the country
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Table 8: Success and Growth-alternative definitions ofsuccess
Simultaneous equations approach. Estimation by AGLS techmque. T-statIstIcs In parenthesis. Success as in
definition 2, 3,4. Growth is real per capita GDP growth rate. See appendix A for variables' definitions
S (def.2) S (def.3) S (def.4)
Dependent variables s· Growth s· Growth s· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sc 0.003 0.004 0.003
(2.01) (1.94) (1.70)
Growth 38.44 21.49 14.72
(2.06) (1.32) (0.92)
Growth (t-l) 0.22 0.23 0.25
(4.49) (4.60) (4.74)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.14 0.14 0.14
(2.10) (1.94) (1.92)
Size 1.38 1.03 1.58
(4.45) (3.57) (5.65)
Comp 0.59 0.0059 0.64 0.0052 0.65 0.0065
(2.15) (2.61) (2.51) (1.96) (2.80) (2.87)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.63 0.29 0.81
(1.51) (0.77) (2.04)
Left government 0.72 0.54 0.55
(2.70) (2.18) (2.30)
Centre government -0.43 -0.12 -0.46
(-0.90) (-0.37) (-1.10)
Majority government -0.12 -0.19 -0.13
(-0.48) (-0.79) (-0.53)
Constant -3.40 0.02 -2.60 0.02 -2.69 0.018
(-6.05) (4.92) (-5.77) (4.18) (-5.82) (5.15)
N. of observations 390 390 390
2 'd 3.05 5.33 2.37X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.69 0.38 0.80
..
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Table 9: Success and Growth-alternative indicators of the fiscal policy stance
Dependent variables s· Growth s· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Se 0.003 0.004
(1.55) (2.47)
Growth 35.57 36.0
(1.95) (1.98)
Growth (t-l) 0.21 0.20
(4.30) (4.14)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.15 0.15
(2.00) (2.18)
Size 1.24 0.003 1.31
(3.67) (0.54) (4.18)
Comp(b) 0.68 0.007 0.66 0.006
(2.13) (2.07) (2.10) (1.92)
DebtlGDP (t-l) 0.68 0.66
(1.59) (1.69)
Left government 0.72 0.68
(2.62) (2.70)
Centre government -0.35 -0.27
(-0.75) (-0.67)
Majority government -0.07 -0.05
(-0.30) (-0.22)
Constant -3.43 0.017 -3.43 0.019
(-6.41 ) (2.79) (-6.57) (4.15)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 4.02 5.22X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.40 0.39
See Table 3.
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Table 10: Success and Growth-alternative indicators of the fiscal policy stance
Dependent variables S· Growth S· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
So 0.003 0.004
(1.53) (2.34)
Growth 34.78 35.07
(1.87) (1.89)
Growth (t-l) 0.22 0.21
(4.41) (4.25)
Growth G7 (t-1) 0.14 0.14
(1.91) (2.10)
Size 1.24 0.002 1.31
(3.69) (0.51) (4.19)
Comp(c) 0.92 0.009 0.90 0.008
(2.21) (2.28) (2.18) (2.13)
Debt/GOP (t-l) 0.66 0.64
(1.50) (1.60)
Left government 0.75 0.73
(2.68) (2.78)
Centre government -0.43 -0.34
(-0.85) (-0.77)
Majority government -0.07 -0.05
(-0.29) (-0.22)
Constant -3.53 0.016 -3.53 0.019
(-6.31 ) (2.69) (-6.45) (3.83)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 4.10 5.24X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.39 0.39
See Table 3.
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Table 11: Success and Growth-alternative indicators of the fiscal policy stance
Dependent variables s* Growth s* Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S· 0.0026 0.0037
(1.65) (2.20)
Growth 32.84 35.50
(1.65) (1.96)
Growth (t-l) 0.24 0.22
(4.88) (4.57)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.11 0.15
(1.62) (2.15)
Size 1.26 1.22
(3.89) (3.90)
Comp 0.60 0.0022 0.72 0.005
(2.21) (1.03) (2.46) (1.90)
Dew 0.34 0.0066
(1.07) (3.19)
Dlabtax
-0.18 0.002
(-0.98) (1.71)
Debt/GOP (t-l) 0.63 0.62
(1.38) (1.53)
Left government 0.76 0.75
(2.58) (2.77)
Centre government -0.31 -0.32
(-0.60) (-0.74)
Majority government -0.18 -0.11
(-0.65) (-0.45)
Constant -3.46 0.02 -3.41 0.02
(-5.59) (4.36) (-5.95) (4.78)
N. ofobservations 390 390
2 .d 5.07 5.09X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.41 0.40
See Table 3.
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Table 12: Success and Growth-alternative indicators of the fiscal policy stance
Dependent variables s· Growth s· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Se 0.003 0.0001
(1.63) (1.58)
Growth 50.27 50.36
(2.01) (1.99)
Growth (t-1) 0.20 0.26
(3.99) (5.05)
Growth G7 (t-1) 0.11 0.13
(1.51) (1.75)
I::. Pro Balance/GDP -319.5 1.03 -319.7
(-3.50) (1.42) (-3.46)
(I::. Pro Balance/GDp)2 -5206.3 18.26 -5160.3
(-3.02) (1.52) (-2.97)
Camp 0.58 0.0043 0.56 0.008
(1.46) (1.47) (1.36) (5.65)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.53 0.58
(0.91) (0.82)
Left government 0.78 0.83
(1.97) (2.01)
Centre government 0.04 -0.03
(0.08) (-0.04)
Majority government 0.21 0.24
(0.62) (0.56)
Constant -6.99 0.03 -7.03 0.014
(-4.48) (2.58) (-4.37) (7.84)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 1.76 5.07X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.78 0.53
See Table 3.
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Table 13: Success and Growth-alternative indicators ofthe fiscal policy stance
Dependent variables s* Growth s* Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S· 0.003 0.0002
(1.45) (1.65)
Growth 46.66 48.33
(1. 74) (1.79)
Growth (t-l) 0.22 0.26
(4.250 (5.32)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.08 0.1
(1.11) (1.38)
11 Pro Balance/GDP -372.1 1.09
-370.9
(3.71) (1.29) (-3.68)
(11 Pro Balance/GDp)2 -6142 19.6
-6084
(-3.24) (1.39) (-3.19)
Comp 0.76 -0.0002 0.69 0.003
(1.83) (-0.072) (1.65) (1.94)
Dew 0.46 0.0056 0.45 0.008
(1.05) (2.05) (1.01) (5.07)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.50 0.65
(0.79) (0.89)
Left government 0.79 0.77
(1.87) (1.79)
Centre government 0.27 0.01
(0.42) (0.01)
Majority government 0.18 0.24
(0.49) (0.53)
Constant -7.94 0.035 -8.0 0.01
(-4.62) (2.28) (-4.56) (8.34)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 3.42 5.47X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.49 0.48
See Table 3.
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Table 14: Success and Growth-alternative indicators of the fiscal policy stance
Dependent variables s· Growth s· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S· 0.003 0.0002
(1.62) (1.83)
Growth 49.86 49.54
(2.06) (2.04)
Growth (t-l) 0.22 0.27
(4.19) (5.23)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.11 0.13
(1.53) (1.77)
11 Pro Balance/GDP -320.8 0.97
-321
(-3.49) (1.35) (-3.47)
(11 Pro Balance/GDp)2 -5251.5 (18.1 )
-5196.1
(-3.02) (1.53) (-2.97)
Comp 0.64 0.60 0.008
(1.47) (1.36) (5.22)
Dlabtax -0.09
-0.08 0.002
(-0.34) (-0.30) (1.64)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.52 0.57
(0.88) (0.80)
Left government 0.77 0.83
(1.95) (2.02)
Centre government -0.017 -0.03
(-0.03) (-0.04)
Majority government 0.23 0.23
(0.66) (0.52)
Constant -7.03 0.033 -7.06 0.01
(-4.44) (2.57) (-4.35) (7.97)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 1.73 6.67X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.79 0.35
See Table 3.
81
Table15: Success and Growth: alternative functional form specification
Dependent variables S· Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
S· 0.036 0.009 0.0008
(0.86) (0.88) (0.06)
Growth (t-l) 11.59 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.26
(1.98) (5.15) (1.01) (3.45) (5.05)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.14
(1.88) (1.82) (1.84) (1.89)
Size 1.48 0.0059 -0.0025 0.006
(4.62) (1.46) (-0.16) (0.95)
Comp 0.94 0.009 0.009 0.009
(4.02) (6.43) (3.26) (5.39)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.64
(1.36)
Left government 0.73
(2.70)
Centre government -0.71
(-1.27)
Majority government -0.20
(-0.73)
Constant -2.84 0.011 0.01 0.01 0.01
(-6.35) (7.48) (0.91) (3.95) (7.21)
N. of observations 390 390 390 390 390
R2 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.20
See Table 1 and Section 5.4. Se is defined by the following equation: Site=E[Pr ob(s/>O)IIt]
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Table 16: Success and Growth-centralized versus decentralized labor markets
Dependent variables s* Growth s* Growth s* Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S· 0.003 0.003 0.003
(2.09) (2.12) (2.13)
Growth 33.35 34.40 32.60
(1.72) (1.78) (1.67)
Growth (t-1) 0.22 0.22 0.22
(4.47) (4.46) (4.51)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.15 0.15 0.15
(2.18) (2.21) (2.19)
Size 1.32 1.33 1.40
(3.96) (4.01) (4.04)
C*Comp 1.51 0.002 1.48 0.002 1.48 0.002
(3.33) (0.48) (3.28) (0.50) (3.24) (0.60)
I*Comp -0.009 0.0097 0.073 0.0093 0.06 0.0096
(-0.01) (2.69) (0.16) (3.03) (0.15) (3.47)
D*Comp 0.55 0.0090 0.62 0.0092 0.85 0.0089
(1.34) (3.05) (1.40) (2.78) (1.63) (2.43)
O*Comp 0.41 0.001 0.42 0.001 0.42 0.001
(1.12) (0.40) (1.13) (0.38) (1.09) (0.43)
DebtlGDP (t-l) 0.97 0.89 0.92
(2.01) '; (1.92) (1.96)
Left government 0.68 0.70 0.73
(2.46) (2.52) (2.51)
Centre government -0.44 -0.44 -0.46
(-0.92) (-0.94) (-0.95)
Majority government -0.03 -0.06 -0.14
(-0.13) (-0.21) (-0.46)
Constant -3.52 0.02 -3.50 0.02 -3.48 0.02
(-5.78) (4.91) (-5.78) (4.92) (-5.66) (5.01)
N. of observations 390 390 390
2 'd 4.19 4.50 5.06X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.52 0.48 0.41
See Table 3. and Section 5.5.
83
Table 17: Success and Private Consumption
Dependent variables S· Consumption S· Consumption
(I) (2) (3) (4)
S-
-0.0008
-0.0004
(-0.44) (-0.26)
Consumption 26.67 27.12
(1.63) (1.66)
Growth (t-l) 0.38 0.37
(6.99) (7.06)
Growth G7 (t-l)
-0.02 -0.01
(-0.25) (-0.12)
Size 1.35 0.0017 1.37
(4.03) (0.33) (4.09)
Comp 0.84 0.0064 0.83 0.006
(3.27) (2.58) (3.22) (2.67)
Debt/GDP (t-l) 0.56 0.59
(1.16) (1.20)
Left government 0.92 0.90
(3.00) (2.94)
Centre government -0.50 -0.57
(-0.87) (-0.96)
Majority government -0.46 -0.37
(-1.49) (-1.21)
Constant -3.04 0.01 -3.08 0.01
(-5.27) (1.83) (-5.31) (2.67)
N. of observations 390 390
2 'd 7.20 7.39X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.12 0.19
Simultaneous equations approach. Estimation by AGLS technique. T-statistics in parenthesis. Success as in
definition 1. Consumption is real per capita private consumption growth rate. See appendix A for variables'
definitions.
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Table 18: Success and Private Investment
Dependent variables s· Investment s· Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S· 0.006 0.005
(1.02) (1.14)
Investment 8.92 8.88
(2.04) (2.03)
Growth (t-l) 1.06 1.07
(6.47) (6.64)
Growth G7 (t-l) 0.55 0.55
(2.31 ) (2.40)
Size 1.46 -0.003 1.44
(4.41) (-0.21) (4.49)
Comp 0.62 0.027 0.62 0.028
(2.35) (3.59) (2.37) (3.99)
Debt/GDP (t-1) 0.72 0.71
(1.65) (1.62)
Left government 0.73 0.73
(2.64) (2.68)
Centre government -0.73 -0.75
(-1.43) (-1.45)
Majority government -0.09 -0.11
(0.33) (-0.40)
Constant -2.91 0.008 -2.90 0.006
(-6.84) (0.48) (-6.77) (0.47)
N. of observations 393 393
2 'd 7.03 6.89X test: oven . restr.
p-value 0.13 0.23
Simultaneous equations approach. Estimation by AGLS technique. T-statistics in parenthesis. Success as in
definition 1. Investment is real per private investment growth rate. See appendix A for variables'
definitions.
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S S· .)UIIlIlBl'Y tatistics
All Sample Flsrnl. Stabilizations SU<Xffi3
PriImry Balance
-0.13
-2.45 -2.47
(0.00) (0.16) (0.17)
PriImry ~nditllre> 0.16
-l.a> -1.72
(0.00) (0.19) (0.20)
GJvernrrnnt. Wage> 0.04
-0.27 -0.50
(Om) (O.~) (0.00)
Thtal Revenllffi 0.27 1.00 0.70
(0.00) (0.13) (0.19)
Laror Th.xEs 0.16 0.3i 0.04
(0.04) (0.11) (0.19)
lli:t/GDP 56.02 63.79 00.38
(1.34) (3.35) (5.00)
GDPGrowth 1.g) 2.54 3.00
(0.11) (0.20) (0.26)
GOP Growth (G7) 1.&l 2.07 2.53
(o.CB) (0.16) (0.18)
Thdl -l.ffi -2.18 -0.85
(0.31) (0.70) (1.02)
o/<AM2 10.74 11.73 9.67
(0.38) (1.26) (1.35)
SOOrt nOO1. interest 10.34 11.21 9.34
(0.21) (0.54) (0.49)
Right GoverIIIrent 0.53 D.J9 0.00
Centre Governrrent 0.15 0.13 0.02
Left Governrrent 0.32 0.23 0.11
Majority lli'ernrrent 0.33 0.13 OJ.6
Cbilition 0.67 0.22 0.07
Years of Elections O.:JJ 0.15 0.07
..Source: OECD, 00, Budge, Kernan and Woldendrop, (1993), Political Handbook of the World.
F1lK:al Stabilizatiolls and Success as in definition 1. Sample as in the bellChmark model F1iDll
variables are changes in share of GOP. Primary balance, primary expenditures, total revenues,
Jabor taxes are cyclically adjusted. Standard errors of the means in parentheois. The last six
ro.vs shc:w the relative frequency of different outCOlIE6 as a function of the type and the ideology
of the governments, and of the occurrelloe of an election during the year. Colunm 1 shows the
relative frequency of each political characteristic in the sample, (e.g.: the sixth row from the
bottom indicates that governments in the sample are right oriented in about 53 percent of the
time). Colunm 2 (3) shows the relative frequency with which a liscaI adjustment (a successfulliscal
adjustment) occurs, (e.g.: the sixth row from the bottom says that right gC1YB£lUIEIlts implement
(successful) liscaI stabilizations 19 (6) percent of the time). See, for example, AleIina, Perotti and
Tavares (1998) for tables similar to this one.
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Figure 1: Gross General Government Debt
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investrnent1
1 Introduction
In the last three decades, fiscal policy in many DEeD countries has experienced
large swings. In the seventies and early eighties, fiscal profligacy led to the accu-
mulation of large deficits. Then, from the mid eighties onward, several countries
implemented fiscal adjustments which, with different degree of success, slowed the
growth of public debts.
Looking at this evidence, a lively recent literature has pointed out the im-
portance of the so called "non keynesian" 'effects of fiscal policy. Starting with
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), several authors have noted that some (but not all)
fiscal contractions have been expansionary, even in the very short run, in contrast
to the prediction of standard models driven by aggregate demand. Even though
episodes of rapid fiscal expansions have been relatively less studied, Alesina and
Ardagna (1998) show evidence of "non keynesian effects" in this direction as well,
namely they point out that several fiscal expansions have been contractionary.
lThis chapter is coauthored with Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and Fabio Schiantarelli
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Most of the empirical literature has focused. on the effects of large fiscal con-
tractions (expansions) on private consumption2; however, as noted, for instance,
by Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), even a cursory look at episodes of large
swings in fiscal policy suggests that private investment explains a disproportionate
share of the response of GDP growth to these large changes in the fiscal stance.
The motivation of this paper is that in order to better understand the macroe-
conomic effects of fiscal policy in aEeD countries, one needs to shift the focus of
the analysis to business investments.
Needless to say, this is not the first paper on the effects of fiscal policy on
investment. A large and important literature studies the effects of taxes on the
cost of capital, using either aggregate or firm level data. However, due to the
amount of information needed to construct a good measure of the cost of capital,
this approach tends to be country specific3 . In the macroeconornic literature, a
recent strand of research uses numerical solutions of real business cycles models
with perfectly competitive factor and output markets to evaluate the effects of
2For the theorethical work on Hnon-Keynesian" effects of fiscal adjustments see Blanchard
(1990), Drazen (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), Sutherland (1997), and Perotti (1999); for
empirical work see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996), Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (1998) and
Perotti (1999). All these papers focus on consumption.
3See, for example, Hasset and Hubbard (1996) and Chirinko (1993) for a review. For rocent
contributions using firm level panel data see Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994) for the UK
and Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) for the US. For international evidence see Cummins,
Hasset and Hubbard (1995).
89
fiscal policy on investment4 • This literature focuses on the supply-side responses of
capital and labor to changes in spending and taxation and its based on calibration
methods.
In this paper, instead, we do not use calibration but we rely on econometric
evidenre on a panel of OEeD countries to assess the effects of taxation and expen-
diture on investment. We focus on the role of profits as a determinant of investment
and we show below that the composition of changes in fiscal policy is particularly
important for profits. We share our emphasis on profits and the supply-side with
Bruno and Sachs (1985), Blanchard (1997) and Lane and Perotti (1999). We share
the focus on composition of fiscal policy with Alesina and Perotti (1995), (1997a),
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (1998), Me Dermott
and Wescott (1996), and Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
We reach several conclusions. First, increases (reductions) of public spending
reduce (increase) profits and, therefore, investment. The magnitude of these effects
is substantial. A reduction by one percentage point in the ratio of primary spending
over GDP leads to an increase in investment by 0.16 percentage points of GDP
on impact, and a cumulative increase by 0.50 after two years and 0.80 percentage
points of GDP after five years. The effect is particularly strong when the spending
cut falls on government wages: in response to a cut in the public wage bill by 1
percent of GDP, the figures above become 0.51, 1.83 and 2.77 per cent, respectively.
4See Barro (1989) Baxter and King, (1993), Dotsey and Mao (1994), Ludvigson (1996), Oha-
nian (1997), Finn (1998), Olivei, (1998).
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Second, increases (reductions) in taxes reduce (increase) profits and investment,
but the magnitude of these tax effects is smaller than those on the expenditure side.
In accordance to our emphasis on labor markets effects of fiscal policy, taxes on
labor have the largest effects on profits. For instance, an increase of one·percentage
point of GDP of taxes on labor leads to a reduction of the investment over GDP
ratio by 0.17 on impact and a cumulative effect of about 0.7 in five years. We
argue that this effect is due to the fact that higher labor taxes imply higher pre
tax wages demanded by workers.5
Third, the magnitude of our coefficients suggests that there may be nothing
special in the behavior of investment at the time of expansionary fiscal adjust-
ments. As shown by Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998),
expansionary fiscal adjustments are on average implemented mostly by spending
cuts, particularly on government wages and transfers, while contractionary ones
are characterized by tax increases. The estimated effect of spending and taxes on
investment imply that the different composition of the stabilization package can
account for the observed difference in investment growth rates. We do not find sig-
nificant "non linearities" or structural breaks in the reaction of investment around
large fiscal consolidations.6 This result suggests that we may not need ;'special
theories" to explain episodes of large fiscal adj ustments.
5This effect can occur both in competitive and unionized labor markets. For more discussion
of this point and for direct evidence, see Alffiina and Perotti (1997).
6This rffiult is consistent with the empirical evidence of Ardagna (1999).
91
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of investment,
profits and fiscal policy. Sections 3 discusses the data. Section 4 displays our
main results on profits and investment and illustrates the quantitative effects from
different types of fiscal policy on investment. Section 5 discusses the sensitivity and
robustness of our results. Section 6 relates our results to the empirical evidence
on large fiscal adjustments. The last section concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Profits, investment and fiscal policy
We discuss the link between fiscal policy and investment using a standard invest-
ment model with convex adjustment costs as in Abel and Blanchard (1986). A vast
literature has investigated the role of the tax code, like depreciation allowances,
investment tax credits, and deductability of interest payments, etc. on the com-
putation of the costs of capital. Although the cost of capital has been found to be
significantly related to investment, the elasticity tends to be small (see for instance
Chirinko and Fazzari (1998)). Thus, the effects of fiscal policy through this channel
are not likely to be large. Moreover, it is far from clear that a careful modelling
of tax incentives makes much difference7• Here we depart from this literature by
7See Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994) for empirical evidence on this point. However,
Cummins, Hasset, Hubbard (1995) present a more upbeat evaluation of the effects of taxation
on investment.
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emphasizing effects of fiscal policy which operate mainly through the labor market.
Firms maximize the expected present discounted value of cash flow, \It:
00 j
\It = Et L II (1+Tt+s)-l(l-T t+s) [F(Kt+j, Lt+j ) - H(Kt+j1 It+j ) - wt+jLt+j - It+j]
t=O 8=0
(1)
subject to the capital accumulation equation
K t = K t - 1(1 - 8) + It (2)
Kt is the capital stock, It the rate of gross investment, Lt is labor input, Tt is
the one period (expected) nlarket rate of return, Tt the tax rate on profits, and
8 the rate of depreciation. F(Kt1 Lt) - H(Kt , It) is the net production function
where H(Kt, It) describes the cost of adjusting the capital stock which is convex
in It.
Equation (1) assumes that the firm is perfectly competitive, capital becomes
productive immediately, the price of investment goods relative to the output price
is one and investment expenditures at time t are fully tax deductible.8 We also
assume that the gross production function F(Kt , Lt ) and the adjustment cost func-
tion H(Kt , It) are linear homogeneous in their arguments so that F(Kt , Ld can
8If investment expenditures are not tax deduetable (1 - Tt) should not multiply It- Most
countries, in reality, are somewhere in between these two extreme cases, with depreciations
allowances spread over time and with additional deductions for investment expenditures allowed
in the first year.
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and elf > O. Under these assumptions, it is well known that the firm optimal plan
satisfies:
where:
.!.:.. = i(A - 1)'K
t
t , if ( .) == c
f
-1 ( .) > 0 (3)
11K ,l < 0; 11K ,2 > 0
(4)
(5)
The marginal (net) product of capital, IlK, is a function of the capital/labor ra-
c (It/ Kt ). Moreover, (Jt+i = (1 - 8)/(1 + rt+j); It+i = (1 - Tt+j)/(l - Tt+j-1).
We will call (Jt the discount factor and It the corporate tax factor9 • Note that
At equals the shadow value of one additional unit of capital in absence of taxation
At divided by (1 - Tt), (i.e.: At = ~t/ (1 - Tt)).
Thus, the investment rate is a function of the (tax-adjusted) shadow value
of capital, which depends upon the expected present discounted value of the net
marginal product of capital, IlK (see equations (3) and (4)). IlK is a decreasing
function of the capital labor ratio, which is an increasing function of the real wage
rate through the first order condition for labor (see equations (4) and (5)). Ceteris
paribus, an increase (current or expected) in the real wage decreases the shadow
9We assume that the market rate of return r is exogenous in the model. Our economy can,
thus, be considered a small open economy.
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value of capital and, hence, investment. The fiscal policy channel which we focus
on is the effect of public spending and taxes on labor costs and therefore profits.
There are several ways to rationalize this \'supply-side" link between fiscal
policy and investment. In a competitive labor market increases in taxes on labor
income lead to a decrease in the individual's labor supply of hours at each level of
the gross wage, assuming the substitution effect dominates. Increases in taxes or
unemployment benefits also affect participation decisions and reduce total labor
supply. Finally, an increase in public employment increases total labor demand,
and therefore puts upward pressure on the equilibrium wage10 . The opposite holds
for reduction in taxes, unemployment benefits or public employment.
In the context of unionized labor markets, similar effects hold. 11 For many
specifications of the union objective function and of the nature of the wage bargain,
an increase in income taxes or in social security contributions that reduces the net
wage of a worker leads to an increase in the pre-tax real wage faced by the firm.
Moreover, the spending side of the government budget influences the reservation
utility of not being employed by a given firm in more than one way. First, public
employment can be an alternative to employment in the private sector. Thus,
higher public wages and/or public ernployment increase the reservation utility of
union members. Second, unemployment cornpensation and various other transfer
10 For an analysis of the effect of public employment on investment in a real business cycle
model, see Finn (1998).
11See, for instance, Jackman, Layard and Nickell, (1991).
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programs reduce the costs of unemployment. Therefore, higher public spending
(particularly on government wages, transfers and welfare) increases the real wage
demanded by the unions, thus reducing marginal profits and, hence, investment.
We can summarize in a simple way the effects of fiscal policy on the equilibrium
wage at each level of the aggregate capital stock K T •
(6)
where K T is the total capital stock equal to the capital stock of each individual
firm times the number of firms and X G is a vector of fiscal policy variables, includ-
ing labor taxes, unemployment benefits, the public sector wage rate and public
employment12 • In the perfectly competitive model KT enters the wage schedule
because it determines the position of the aggregate demand for labor at a given
wage rate. W t in this case equates the demand and supply of labor, which depends
upon fiscal variables13 • Also in a union model it is reasonable to assume that
K T affects positively the equilibrium wage14 •
12See Calmfors and Horn (1986) for a model of a centralized union that bargains both for
private and public sector workers and Holmund (1997) for a model with separate unions. In the
latter paper there can be wage differences between private and public wages in equilibrium.
13 Using equation (5) total labor demand equals LT = ;{£j, where LT = N L t and K[ = N K t
and N denotes the number of firms. Note that we have assumed for simplicity a labor supply
that depends only upon the contemporaneous wage.
14Under constant returns to scale, standard monopolistic union models imply that the wage is
independent of the capital stock of the individual firm for any given level of alternative income.
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If we assume perfect foresight, we can easily represent graphically the effect
of changes in the fiscal policy parameters on the capital stock through the wage
channel. The two equations defining the steady state (from (2), (3), (4) and (5))
are
i (A - 1) = 8 (7)
- f'('ljJ(w)) - (A - l)i(A - 1) + C(i(A - 1)) + (1 - (J)A = 0 (8)
Equation (7) is the 6.K[ = 0 locus and it implies that in steady state the
aggregate capital stock is constant when A equals 1 + c' (8). For values of A greater
(smaller) than 1 + c' (0) the investment rate exceeds (falls short) the depreciation
rate 8 and the capital stock grows (contracts). Equation (8) defines the 6.At+l = 0
locus. Since the wage rate is an increasing function of the capital stock K T (see
(6)) and the marginal product of capital a decreasing function of the wage, one
can show that the 6.At+l = 0 locus is downward sloping15 . For values of A above
However, in general equilibrium, it is possible to show that, under reasonable assumptions, the
alternative income to union members, and hence the union wage, are increasing functions of the
capital stock. Note that the solution to the one period union model is also the time consistent
contract in a dynamic game in which the union has an intertemporal utility function and acts as
the Stackelberg leader facing a firm with convex adjustment costs for capital (see Van der Ploeg
(1988)). See also Devereux and Lockwood (1991), Denny and Nickell (1993) on the determination
of the capital stock in union models.
15More precisely,
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(below) the locus, the shadow value of capital increases (decreases). The t1K[ = 0
and the t1At+l = 0 loci are represented in Figure 1. The steady state equilibrium
is saddle-path stable16 •
When there is an unanticipated permanent increase in public employment,
public sector wage, unemployment benefits or labor taxes at a given level of the
discount rate, the t1,xt+1 = 0 locus shifts downward and the steady state capital
stock decreases from KJ' to K[. The investment rate falls discretely below the
depreciation rate, following the discrete fall of ,\ (see move from point Eo to D),
and then it recovers gradually. The effect of anticipated changes in fiscal policy
and of unanticipated temporary changes can be similarly analyzed.
2.2 From theory to testing
In order to take the model to the data, we need to pararnetrize the adj ustment cost
function and to select a proxy for the marginal profitability of capital. Finally, we
will have to choose how to model empirically the dependence of marginal profitabil-
ity on fiscal factors. We will assume that adjustment costs are linear homogeneous
and quadratic, i.e. H(Kt, It) = [~(it. - Ct Kt] where Ct is a stochastic shock
when !)'K[ = 0 and !)''xt+l = 0 loci intercept.
16 Note that, given the discount rate, our assumption of full instantaneous deductability of
investment expenditure, yields the result that capital is neutral with respect to the corporate tax
rate in the steady state. See Nickell (1978), chapter 9.
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which is known when firms decide their inputs17 .We will experiment with two
proxies for the gross-of-tax marginal profit of capital, ilK. First, under the as-
sumptions of perfect competition and linear homogeneity we used so far, marginal
profits equals the marginal product of capital and can be approximated by average
profits per unit of capital.
More precisely,
where 7ft denotes average operating profits. For brevity, we will refer to this as
the "benchmark case". Alternatively, if we assume that the production function
is Cobb-Douglas, and the firm is imperfectly competitive, marginal profits can be
shown to be approximately a multiple of the sales to capital ratio BtlK t , i.e.: UK =
() (Btl Kt),where () equals the elasticity of output with respect to capital times the
markup of prices over marginal costs18 • If we use average gross-of-tax profits to
proxy for marginal gross-of-tax profits, and linearize around sample means of 7ft+j,
(3t+j, and ft+j' we obtain:
17In the empirical analysis, we allow for different alternative assumptions about the nature of
the error term. In particular, we allow it either to have an AR(1) structure or to be a random
walk. Blundell et al. (1992) find evidence of an AR(l) structure for Ct using panel data.
18 800 also Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).
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where variables with a bar denote sample means. We have omitted additive con-
stants for ease of notation and we have used the approximations (3t+i ~ 1-Tt+i - 6
and {Hi ~ 1 - (Tt+i - Tt+i-d/(1 - T). Thus, the optimal rate of investment de-
pends on the present discounted value of future cash flow, of the discount factor,
and of the corporate tax factor19 •
A particularly simple and illuminating case is when in equation (10) f3t+i and
{t+i are constant over time, with the latter set equal to one (implying no changes
in corporate taxes). In this case, the optimal rate of investment is:
(11)
Finally, we must specify an estimable system linking government spending,
taxes and profits. Our strategy is to use the estimates of this system to construct
a series for A, which we then use to estimate equation (10)20. Starting with the
simplest case in which (3t+i is constant and {Hi is set equal to one, we use the
19If gross-of-tax profits are proxied instead by the sales to capital ratio, equation (10) would still
be valid, with (}St replacing 7ft. If investment expenditures are not tax deductable (10) become:;
it ~ t;Et [EJ=o(lJ)j7f;+j +~ EJ=o(ft)j (3t+j+l] + Ct
where 7f;+j = (1 - Tt+j)7ft+j denotes average profits net of taxes.
20The q theory of investment has not been always empirically successful. Our emphasis here,
however, is not on a test of q theory versus alternatives. We are interested in emphasiszing a link
between profits and investment and below we also allow for liquidity effects. For an excellent
discussion of the "state of the art" of investment theory and empirics, see Caballero (1999).
100
following profit equation:
(12)
where Gt and Rt are public spending and revenue (or spending and revenue com-
ponents) as a share of trend GDP and 'if is gross/net-of-tax profits or value added
in the business sector as a share of the capital stock. Gross-of-tax profits are de-
fined as value added in the business sector minus labor costs. On the basis of the
previous discussion, we would expect both a3 and a4 to be negative. The evolution
of revenue and expenditure is described by a simple VAR system:
dllRt-l +d12Rt - 2 +d13G t - 1 +d14Gt - 2 + 'fit
d21Rt - 1 + d22Rt - 2 + d23Gt - 1 + d24Gt - 2 + Wt
(13a)
(13b)
In estimation Gt and Rt are cyclically adj usted to eliminate the automatic changes
in the variable induced by business cycle fluctuations.
However, there could be a second source of endogeneity between profits on one
hand, and revenues and expenditures on the other: the discretionary response of
the policymakers to business cycle fluctuations. We do not have any quantitative
estimate of this channel of endogeneity, but we believe that, due to the "long and
variable" decision lags in fiscal policy, this source of endogeneity is unlikely to be
too serious. The budget for year t is usually discussed and approved during the
second half of year t - 1. Some additional fiscal policy measures are sometimes
decided during the year, but they usually represent a small fraction of the budget,
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and most of the times they become effective only by the end of the year. Thus, our
assumption that cyclically adjusted Gt and Rt do not depend on current profits (or
CDP) is likely to be a reasonable, although imperfect, approximation to reality.
For the same reasons, we assume that Gt and Rt are known at the beginning of
the period. By contrast, we will initially assume that 1rt is not in the information
set at time t: thus, the first term in the infinite sum that enters the construction
of At in equation (10) is the expected value of 1rt conditional on the values of the
variables on the right hand side of (12). We will routinely check that our estimates
of the investment equation are not unduly sensitive to this assumption. That is,
we will also allow for the case of 1rt in the information set at time t, so that the
actual value of 1rt can be used in constructing At.21
For the more general model with variable discount and corporate tax factors,
in section 5 we will augment the system of forecasting equations in (12) and (13)
with:
(14)
Moreover, we augment the VAR for Gt and Rt with the corporate tax rate Tt.
Finally, we will experiment with adding an output variable to the profit function
and hence to the system of equations generating expectations.
21 Note that, although 'T/t and Wt are uncorrelated with Ut, they need not be uncorrelated with
each other. As long as (12) is used to forecast future profits and therefore to construct At, this
is not a problem. We will have to take up this issue again when we study the impulse responses
of investment to spending or revenue shocks.
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3 Data
All our data are from the OECD 1997 Economic Outlook Database. Our sample
includes 18 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Swe-
den, United Kingdom, United States, covering a maximum time span from 1960
to 199622 • The data appendix contains the precise definition of all the variables
we use and some descriptive statistics.
Each component of revenues - direct taxes on households, business taxes, indi-
rect taxes, and social security contributions - is cyclically adjusted by computing
the value of the component if GDP were at its trend level instead than at its actual
level, using the GDP elasticities provided by the 0 ECD. We calculate trend GDP
separately for each country in the sample, by regressing log GDP in real terms on
a constant and a quadratic trend23 • Hence, for each component of revenues we
compute:
(15)
22Two small GECD countries, Luxembourg and Iceland, are excluded, together with the new
members of this group admitted only recently. New Zealand, Portugal, and Switzerland are
excluded because of data problems.
23Thus, we apply the same cyclical adjustment as the OEeD, except that we use trend GDP
as the reference value of output, rather than 'potential output' as calculated by the GECD. See
OECD, Fiscal Position and Business Cycles, Users' Guide for Statistics on diskette, for the
values of the tax elasticities. We also used the Rodrick-Prescott filter to estimate trend GDP,
obtaining similar results.
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where R~A is the cyclically adjusted revenue item, RftCA is the actual revenue
item, GDPVTRt is trend real GDP, GDPVt, is real GDP, and O-i is the elasticity
of the revenue item i to real GDP. A similar adjustment is applied to total pri-
mary spending and transfers24 . We then divide each cyclically adjusted revenue
component and each spending component by trend GDP. Investment and profits
are divided by the capital stock to obtain the investment and profit rates.
Unit root tests run country by country on all the variables used in the equa-
tions did not allow us to reject the presence of a unit root for all the countries.
However, given the low power of the Phillips-Perron test in small sample, we also
implemented the unit root test proposed by 1m, Pesaran and Shin (1995) on the
panel. This time, the evidence was in favor of stationarity25. We first estimate our
model in levels, detrending all the variables, allowing for country specific linear
and quadratic trends26 . In section 5 we present results of an estimation in first
differences and we experiment with allowing country specific constants to account
24The OEeD does not provide the values of the transfers elasticities. We used. the elasticities
provided for total primary spending and scaled them up by the ratio of transfers to total primary
spending. This is under the reasonable assumption that transfers are the only cyclically sensitive
component of government spending.
25Note that, by dividing revenues and spending by trend GDP, we implicitly assume that GDP
is trend stationary. It is still possible that the ratio between revenues and spending and trend
GDP contains a unit root if the numerators contain a unit root.
260LS estimation in levels with country specific effects is appropriate since we have a panel
with large T.
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for country specific drifts. Our basic results on fiscal policy and investment are
unaffected; in fact, in several respects they are stronger for the model in differences.
4 Empirical results
We consider first the simplest case defined by (11), (12) and (13) above, in which
investment depends only upon future expected marginal profits and the discount
f~tors and corporate tax factors are constant. 27
4.1 The effects of fiscal policy on profits
We begin, in Table 1, by estimating the profit equation (12). Columns 1-3 of this
table correspond to different definitions of the dependent variable. Marginal profit
IlK is proxied by average profit gross of corporate tax payments 7r in column 1, by
average profit net of taxes 7r* in column 2, and by the sales-to-capital ratio SIK
in column 3.
In all three columns, both primary spending and revenues as a share of trend
GDP have a negative and statistically significant effect on marginal profits, and
their coefficients are quite similar across the three columns. Using a coefficient of
0.10 which is roughly the average across the columns in Table 1, an increase in
government spending by 1 percentage point of trend GDP decreases profits as a
271n this case, we assume the corporate tax factor I = 1, and the discount factor {3 = 1-6-r =
0.88, where 6 = 0.1 and r = 0.02, the average value in our sample.
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share of the capital stock by about 1/10 of a percentage point, and an increase
in taxes by the same amount has roughly the same effect on profits. At a first
look, these effects may not seem very large. However, many episodes of fiscal
adjustments in recent years have been quite sizable. For instance, in Ireland 1986-
1989, primary spending as share of GDP decreased from 37.9 per cent in 1986
to 29.7 per cent in 1989 and, in the same years, taxes were cut by almost 2.5
Percentage points from 37.6 to 35.25. Using the coefficient in Table 1, this change
in fiscal policy accounts for a ceteris paribus increase in profits as a share of GDP
of almost 2 percentage points28 •
We now consider the effects of the individual budget items. Since the results
are very similar across the three columns of Table 1, in the next tables we present
our regressions using the average profit rate gross of corporate tax payments (as in
columns 1 of Table 1) as our proxy for marginal profits. On the spending side of
the budget (Table 2) we consider transfers, the wage and non-wage components
of government consumption, and government investment. On the revenue side of
the budget (Table 3), we consider in turn labor taxes (defined as the sum of direct
taxes on households, and social security and payroll taxes), taxes on business, and
indirect taxes.
The point estimates of the coefficients of all spending items are negative and
significant at the 5% level, except non-wage government consumption, which is
28We convert the profits/capital ratio into the profits/GDP ratio using the average capi-
tal/GDP ratio of 1.89 for the whole sample.
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significant at the 10% leveL The government wage bill has the strongest negative
effect on profits, with a coefficient of -.43 and a t-statistic of 6.33. Thus, a perma-
nent fall in wage government consumption by 1 percent of GDP would lead to a
ceteris paribus increase in profits as a share of the capital stock by .42 percentage
points and an increase in profits as a share of GDP by .82 percentage points on
impact and of 2.74 percentage points in the steady state.
Among the revenue items, labor taxes have the strongest negative effect on
profits, with a coefficient of -.16 and a t-statistics of 4.25. An increase in labor
taxes by 1 percent of trend GDP would lead to a reduction in profits as a share
of GDP by about .30 percentage points on impact and .98 in the steady state.
These results are consistent with the labor market models discussed above, since
the two components of spending and revenues which seems to affect profits more
are government wages and labor taxation.
4.2 The investment equation
Table 4 displays estimates of the investment equation (11). Following Abel and
Blanchard (1986), and Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993), we add some dy-
namic to our equation by letting the first lag of A also affect investment. Moreover,
we estimate the equation by GLS to account for the presence of a AR(I) error term,
with an autocorrelation coefficient that is allowed to vary across countries.
Columns 1-3 parallel the corresponding columns of Table 1. Thus, marginal
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profits are proxied by gross-of-tax average profits in column 1, by net-of-tax average
profits in column 2, and by the sales to capital ratio in column 3. Column 4 is
exactly like column 1, except that we compute A assuming that current profits are
known at the beginning of the period, rather than with one period delay29.
Contemporaneous A is a significant explanatory variable for investment in all
columns of Table 4, and the one period lagged value is statistically significant
in column 430. The point estimates of the coefficient of contemporaneous A vary
29This implies that the actual value of 7ft is used to construct At. Formally, omitting constants,
if profits are known with one period delay, At is calculated as
At = a'(I - Apt 1AXt
where:
a' = [1 0 0 0 0 0]
X t = [7rt-l Gt Rt 7ft-2 Gt - 1 Rt-d'
X t = AXt- 1 +et,
If current profits are known at the beginning of the period
At = 7ft +7Ja'(I - Bp)-lBXt
where:
Xt = [7ft Gt Rt 7ft-l Gt - 1 Rt-d', Xt = BXt- 1 + It
and A and B are the matrices implied by equations (12 and 13).
30 Because A and A(-1) are generated regressors, the estimates of their coefficients are con-
sistent but, strictly speaking, the standard errors are not correct. If we omit A(-1) from the
equation, since its coefficient is generally very small, the standard t-test of the hypothesis that
the coefficient of contemporaneous A is zero is correct (see Pagan 1984). The results (not shown
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between .05 and .1, and are similar to those implied by the estimates in Blanchard,
Summers and Rhee (1993) for the United States31 •
4.3 Fiscal policy, profits and investment
We now provide some quantitative estimates of the dynamic effects of fiscal policy
on investment. We discuss two types of experiments. The first is meant to give a
rough idea of the order of magnitude of the effects on investment. Suppose primary
government spending falls permanently by 1 percent of trend GDP: what is the
effect on investment? We abstract from the equations for taxes and spending (13a
and 13b) and we treat them as if they were set by the government independently
of their own (or other variables') past. This back-of-the envelope calculation gives
here) suggest that the effect of the shadow value of capital on investment is statistically significant
at conventional levels.
3L Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) adopt a different specification, in that they regress
the first difference of the logarithm of the investment to capital ratio on the first difference of the
logarithm of ,,\ and its first lag, obtaining a coefficient on the contemporaneous ,,\ of .91 in the
full sample and of .54 in the post-war sample. Using an average value for ,,\ of 1, and an average
value of the investment to capital ratio of about 6% in the whole period and 8% in the post-war
period, an increase of ,,\ by 1% would lead to an increase in investment as a share of capital by
.55 percentage points in the whole period and by .43 percentage points in the post-war period.
Summing the coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged "\, the effect would be .94 percentage
points in the whole period and .83 percentage points in the post-war period. These are very close
to the effect of 1 percentage points that we obtain from our estimate in column 1 of Table 4
(note that the coefficient of the first lag of ,,\ is minuscule).
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an approximate answer. Starting from the profit equation in column 1 of Table 1,
a permanent fall in G by 1 percent of trend GDP causes a permanent fall in profits
as share of capital by .09/(1-.67-.03) = .3 percentage points; using a value of (3 of
.88, this leads to a change in A by .3/(1-.88) = 2.5 percent. Using the estimate of
column 1 in Table 4, investment increases by .27 percentage points as a share of
the capital stock, and by .55 percentage points as a share of GDp32 • This is far
from a trivial effect.
The second and more precise experiment consists of tracing out the dynamic
effects of a unit shock to spending or revenues, using the estimates of the whole
system (equations (12) and (13)). Formally, we study the impulse responses of
investment to a shock to spending or revenues.
In order to do this, we need to solve a preliminary question.33 To obtain a
meaningful impulse response from the dynamic system ((12) and (13)), we need
innovations that are mutually orthogonal. While the reduced form innovations "'t
and Wt are certainly orthogonal to Ut, in general they will be correlated with each
other. This means that a shock to, say Wt is not really a "spending shock", but a
32 Note that here and in what follows, we use the fact that
dI d(I/K) K
fix = dx 1 - (1/ K)
since K is the end of the period capital stock. Dividing by GDP we obtain the change of
investment as a percentage of GDP. We set 1/K to 0.07 and K/Y to 1.89, the average sample
values.
33See Blanchard and Perotti (1999) for a more thorough treatment of this issue.
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linear combination of the underlying structural spending and revenue shocks. We
are skeptical about the possibility of recovering the structural, orthogonal shocks
to revenues and spending. Thus, we orthogonalize the innovations in two ways:
first, by letting revenues "corne first", i.e. by adding Rt to the rhs of equation
(13b); alternatively, by letting spending "come first", i.e. by adding G t to the
rhs of equation (13a). Both procedures give orthogonalized spending and revenue
shocks by construction; if the correlation between the reduced form innovations "It
and Wt is small, then the impulse responses to the two orthogonalized spending
shocks obtained with these two procedures will not differ rnuch. In fact, in our
sample the correlation between Wt and "'t is indeed low, .13. As an example, we
will present the results obtained when revenues corne first34 •
Table 5 displays the changes in investment expressed as a share of GDP, due to a
unitary shock at time t, to primary spending, revenues, and their main components,
on impact and up to 5 years, and the cumulative change after the first five, ten
and twenty years35 • For instance, a reduction by one percentage point in the ratio
of primary spending to GDP leads to an increase in the investment/GDP ratio by
.16 percentage points on impact, and to a cumulative increase by .50 percentage
points after two years and by .80 percentage points after five years. The effect
34We also checked (and confirmed) that our results are not unduly sensitive to the orthogonal-
ization procedure.
35In other words, the table displays the impulse responses of the investment to GDP ratio at
different horizons.
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is also statistically significant36 • Increases in taxes reduce investment but the
magnitude of the tax effects is smaller and statistically significant only on impact.
For instance, the cumulative effect on the investment/GDP ratio is -.18 percentage
points, compared with -.80 for spending.
The results on the component of spending are also quite instructive. Consis-
tently with our results on profits, the largest effect is from government wages. For
instance, in response to a cut in the public wage bill by one per cent of GDP, the
impact effect is an increase in the investment/GDP ratio by .51 percentage points;
the cumulative effect at the end of the fifth year is 2.77 percentage points. For
this reason, if the cut in primary spending were concentrate all on government
wages, the magnitude of the effects on investment would be much larger than
those computed above. Labor taxes also have a sizable effect on private invest-
ment. An increase of labor taxes by one percent of GDP leads to a fall in the
investment/GDP ratio by .17 percentage points on impact and by .75 percentage
points in the steady state. The effect of a shock to taxes on labor is significant at
the 10% level on impact and after one year.
36Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping, based on 500 replications. We followed
Runkle (1987). See footnote to Table 5 for details.
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5 Sensitivity and robustness
Our results are robust to a variety of different specifications. In what follows, we
discuss several extensions to our benchmark regressions. We add each extension,
one by one, to the benchmark case.
5.1 The profit function
5.1.1 Adding GDP
In Table 6 we augment our basic profit regression with a measure of "private GDP" ,
namely the ratio of total GDP less government consumption divided by the capital
stock. This measure of the volume of sales per unit of capital is strongly positively
associated with the profit rate. This result holds both in OLS and IV regressions,
where the instruments are appropriately lagged values of the included variables
(see list at the bottom of the table).
Our results on the effects of fiscal policy on profits are virtually unchanged. If
we use this augmented regression of profits to construct A, our results on invest-
ments are also virtually unchanged. The dynamic response of investment to fiscal
policy changes is also very close to the one in Table 5. Consider, for example, aug-
menting the VAR described by equations (12) with an equation for "private GDP"
and adding its lagged value to the profit equation. A reduction by one percentage
point in spending as a share of GDP reduces the investment/GDP ratio by .17
percentage points on impact, and by .61 after five years. In the benchmark model
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in Table 5 these values are 0.16 and 0.80, respectively.
5.1.2 Fiscal policy, labor costs and profits
One important fiscal channel which we emphasize is the effect of public wages and
employment on labor costs in the private sector. A different test of this channel is
to regress profits on real private labor cost instrumented by the government wage
bill. This is done in Table 7. The first four columns of this table use as instruments
for private labor costs various combinations of variables, always including public
wage spending. The results are supportive of our hypothesis and are very robust,
(the coefficient of private labor costs is always negative and significant). They
hold with and without private GDP as a share of capital in the profit regression
(as shown in the table) and for several alternative sets of instruments.
The next four columns use total government spending and/or total revenues
rather than public wage spending and/or labor taxes as instruments. What is
interesting is that the coefficient of instrumented wage is lower in absolute value
than in the previous four columns. The first stage regressions, where the private
wages are regressed on alternative sets of instruments, are quite illuminating. In
fact, Table 8 shows that private wages increase with taxes and public spending.
Moreover, private wages are better explained by public wages rather than by total
government spending. Consistently with our discussion in section 2.2, while total
revenues do not have a positive and statistically significative effect on private wages,
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labor taxes do. Finally, our results for the investment regression are virtually
unchanged when we use these alternative formulations for the profit function.
5.2 First differences
We have re-estimated all our regressions with variables in first differences rather
than in levels. In fact, as discussed above, unit root tests country by country and
on the whole panel lead to opposite conclusions about the order of integration of
the series.
Tables 9 and 10 display the results. In the profit equation (first panel of Table
9), the coefficient of primary spending is twice and that of revenues is three times
as large as the corresponding coefficients in the regression in levels (column 1 of
Table 1). However, in the investment equation (second panel of Table 9), the
coefficient of contemporaneous ,\ is about one tenth compared to the one for the
model in levels of Table 4. Combining these results, Table 10 reports the effects,
at different horizons, on the investment/GDP ratio of a unitary shock to primary
spending and revenues, using the same orthogonalization adopted in Table 5. The
impulse response to a shock in spending in the first five years is similar to the one
obtained for the model in levels. The cumulative effect after the first ten years is
1.49 percentage points for the model in difference and .98 for the model in levels.
In the case of a shock to taxes, the difference with the regressions in levels is more
marked. For instance, after five years, the cumulative effect on investment is almost
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five times as large in the model in differences compared. to the model in levels (-0.87
versus -.16). Moreover, it is of the same order of magnitude as the effect of a shock
in spending. Therefore, the conclusions concerning the quantitative effects of fiscal
policy and in particular of taxation would be reinforced if we rely on the model in
differences. However, the more powerful tests of the unit root on the panel tend
to support the specification in levels.
5.3 Variable discount and corporate tax factors
So far, we have assumed that the firm's discount factor {3t and the corporate tax
rate factor It were constant. We now allow these two terms to vary over time;
thus, the investment equation we estimate is now (10) instead of (11), and we add
equation (14) and the equation for the corporate tax rate to the VAR (13). This
allows us to investigate the effects of changes in the interest rate on investment.
Table 11 reports the corresponding regressions, estimated in the benchmark case
of variables in levels and with marginal profits proxied by average profits gross of
taxes. To compute the discount factor {3t,we use the one-period (net of corporate
taxes) ex post real interest rate to measure the term Tt , and a value of 0.10 for
the depreciation rate {j37.
Column 1 displays the estimate of equation (14) for the real interest rate,
and column 2 of the investment equation (10). In the interest rate equation, the
37Results would be very similar if we used the ex-post real interest rate gross of taxes.
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coefficient of R (i.e. tax revenues) is positive and significant, while the one on G
(i.e. government spending) is negative and significant. These results are somewhat
counterintuitive. However, other authors have also obtained similarly results. For
instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) in a panel study on OECD countries on
the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates find that government deficit is negatively
associated with the interest rates in many specifications.
In the investment equation, Aprof measures the contribution to changes in A
due to changes in average profits, Arint captures, instead, changes due to the net
real rate of interest and Actax changes due to the corporate tax rate (given the
net of taxes interest rate). Thus, these terms correspond to the first, second, and
third terms on the rhs of equation (10), respectively. As expected the interest
rate term has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the investment
equation, while changes in the corporate tax rate term do not have any statistically
significant effect on investments.
Turning to the impulse responses (not shown), the reaction of investment to
a shock in spending is slightly smaller than in the benchmark case. A positive
shock to spending reduces investment through its effects on profits, but it also has
a negative effect on the real interest rate, thus increasing investment. Mter the
first five years, the cumulative effect on investment as a share of GDP due to a
unitary shock in spending is -.73, against -.80 in the benchmark case. By contrast,
a shock to revenues has a stronger effect on investment than in the benchmark
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case. An increase in taxes reduces investrnent both through its effect on profits
and via the real rate of interest; after the first five years, cumulatively, investment
as a share of GDP decreases by .3 percentage points, almost twice as much as in
the benchmark model.
5.4 Time effects
We added year dummies in the regressions as an additional way of controlling for
common shocks to all countries in the sample. Tables 12 and 13 display the profit
regressions thus obtained, as usual with the average profit gross of corporate tax
as a proxy for marginal profits. In Table 12 the independent fiscal policy vari-
ables are primary spending and total revenues (column 1), or primary spending
and the individual revenue items (columns 2 to 4). In Table 13, the independent
fiscal policy variables are total revenues and the individual expenditure items. The
estimated coefficients on public spending are lower than those in the benchmark
case and in one case (when labor taxes are used as the tax variable) the coeffi-
cient becomes insignificant. The coefficients on the revenue items are unchanged.
In Table 13, the coefficients of transfers and non-wage government consumption
are now insignificant, but the coefficient of wage government consumption and of
government investment are still large and significant. As argued above, taxes on
households, social security taxes, and wage government consumption are the items
of the budget with the strongest impact on unit labor costs and firms' profitability.
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5.5 Country by country results
We have re-estimated the profit and investment equations by dropping one country
at a time: none of the resulting 18 regressions for each equation were significantly
different from the regressions we present in the paper.
We have also estirnated the profit and investment equations country by country.
Given the relatively short time series available in each country, results have to be
taken with caution. In any case, the basic picture is encouraging. In the level
regression, the effect of government spending on profits is negative and significant
at the 5 per cent level in 10 out of 18 countries; of the remaining 8 countries,
government spending has a negative, but insignificant coefficient in 4 countries.
No country has a significant positive coefficient. The results on taxes in the profit
equation are slightly less strong. In six countries, the coefficient of revenues is
negative and significant (at the 5% level in three countries, at the 10% level in the
other three); in seven, it is negative but insignificant; in no country the coefficient
is positive and significant.
In the investment equation, in ten countries, contemporaneous and/or lagged
values of A are statistically significant deterrninants of investment. In seven coun-
tries, however, neither contemporaneous nor lagged values of Aare significant, and
in one country the coefficient on A is positive and insignificant, but the coefficient
on lagged A is negative and significant at the 10% level.
We then re-estimated the profit and investrnent equations country by country
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in first differences, and the results are similar to those from the regressions in levels,
in fact, slightly stronger.
5.6 Expectations of profits, financial constraints and in-
vestment
Our specification for A includes all the discounted stream ofexpected future marginal
profits. There are two reasons why the future may not matter so much. One is
financial constraints; some firms may be limited in their access to credit markets.
The other one is that beyond one or two years forecasts of future marginal profits
and of fiscal policy become so unreliable that are basically not used by the firm38 .
The focus of the present paper is not the role of financial constraints (nor the "op-
timal" time horizon firms use for investment decisions) and aggregate data are not
appropriate to address this issue as it deserves. However, the existence of financial
constraints would be relevant for our purposes for two reasons. At the theoretical
level, it would reinforce the negative effects of fiscal policy on investrnent to the ex-
tent that changes in taxes or spending affect the firms' cash flow. Empirically, it is
important to assess whether our constructed A in reality capture firms' availability
of internal funds, rather than expected returns to investments.
Columns 1-2 of Table 14 investigate the presence of financial constraints by
38This is, of course, equivalent to discounting the future beyond, say (t+l), at a much higher
rate.
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applying a standard methodology in the empirical investment literature. We add
the contemporaneous (column 1) or lagged value (column 2) of the profit rate net
of corporate tax payments to our benchmark investment equation. When we use
current profits as our proxy for financial constraints, we tackle endogeneity by
using as instruments the current value and first lag of the fiscal policy variables,
of '\, and of the profit rate. In column (1) the coefficient on profits is negative
but statistically insignificant and the coefficients on A and A (-1) are virtually
unchanged from the estimates in Table 4. In column (2), the coefficient on lagged
profits is 0.07 and significant at the 10% level, consistent with a liquidity effect at
work. At the same time, the coefficient of the contemporaneous value of A falls,
relative to the estimates in Table 4, by 30%, and the one on lagged A by 50%. The
overall effect of a shock to fiscal policy on investment is, however, stronger than
in Table 4. Accounting for financial constraints, investment as a share of GDP
increases approximately by 0.73 percentage points (versus 0.55 in the benchmark
case) in response to permanent decrease in primary spending by 1 percent of trend
GDP.
Columns 3-5 of Table 14 check whether forecasts of future marginal profits
beyond one or two years are indeed relevant for investment decisions. We construct
A including just expected marginal profits at time t (column 3), t and t+1 (column
4), t, t+1 and t+2 (column 5), rather than all the discounted stream of expected
future marginal profits. In column 3, the rnagnitude of the coefficient OIl A is
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three times as big as the one in Table 4. When we extend the forecast horizon
used to construct ,\ (column 5), the magnitude of the coefficient declines and it is
approximately equal to the benchmark case.
Finally, in column 6 (column 7) expected marginal profits at time t and all the
discounted stream of expected future marginal profits (the discounted stream of
expected future marginal profits at time t+1 and t+2) enter as separate regressors
in the investment equation. Only the coefficient of expected marginal profits at
time t has a statistically significant effect on investment and its magnitude is
more than twice that in the benchmark model in Table 4. We also compute the
dynamic response of investment to fiscal policy changes considering the different
specifications in column 3-8. Results are very close to the one in Table 5. In some
specifications, changes in public spending and total revenue have slightly lower
effects on investment. In conclusion, we find that investment is affected mostly by
expected profits for near future. This might be an indication that expectations of
profits too far into the future are too unreliable to be used in computing the present
discounted value of stream of marginal profits. Although interesting, this finding
does not alter our conclusions on the importance of fiscal policy as a determinant
of investment decision of firms.
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6 Large fiscal adjustments
In this section we discuss whether the fiscal effects which we estimated above are
enough to explain the behavior of the economy around the time of large fiscal
adjustments. The literature on large fiscal adjustments has highlighted an impor-
tant empirical regularity. Fiscal adjustments which rely mostly, or exclusively, on
spending cuts, and particularly on transfers and government wages, are associ-
ated with a surge in growth during and imrnediately after the adjustment. The
opposite occurs in the case of adjustments which are tax based39 .While most of
the literature has focused on consumption, Table 15 shows that in fact, business
investment displays a very large amount of variability around fiscal adjustments.
This table shows the surge in investment during expansionary fiscal adjustments
- i.e. those large reductions in the deficit that are associated. with an increase in
growth - and the collapse of investment during the contractionary adjustments40 •
On average, business investment growth rate is -0.36% in the two years before
expansionary fiscal adjustments and it jumps to 5.24% in the two years after the
adjustment. In the contractionary episodes, these numbers are respectively 4.59%
and 0.29%. In the two years before the expansionary adjustments, on average busi-
ness investment contributes negatively to the (moderate) increase in GDP growth,
39See for example Alesina, Perotti and Taveres (1998) and the related literature cited therein.
40The precise definition of expansionary and contractionary fiscal adjustments is given at the
bottom of Table 15.
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while private consumption is responsible for approximately half of that increase41 •
Mter the adjustment, the average contribution from business investment to the
(large) change in GDP growth jumps by almost 24 percentage points, from -6.55%
to 17.17%, while the contribution from private consumption shows just a slightly
increase from 51.37% to 51.82%. The opposite happens in the contractionary
episodes: the contribution to GDP growth by business investment decrease about
15% while the one of private consumption is stable. The downturn which accom-
panies "contractionary" fiscal adjustments is therefore largely explained by the fall
in private business investments. It is also interesting to note how the share of net
exports actually falls drastically during expansionary adjustments and increases
during contractionary ones. This is evidence against the view that expansionary
adjustments are mainly driven by devaluations. In summary, this evidence sug-
gests that private business investment is a critical component of domestic demand
in terms of response to fiscal shocks.
In Table 16 we use our estimated model to see how well we "match" the behavior
of investment around the episodes of fiscal adjustments described in the previous
table. We simply use the fitted value for the investment rate (11K) together with
actual GDP and capital stock figures to calculate the "predicted" growth rate of
business investment and the "predicted" investment to GDP ratio for each country.
41The contribution to GDP growth from each component of aggregate demand weights its
growth rate with the share of each component relative to GDP. This quantity is then expressed
as a proportion of the GDP growth rate. See the notes to Table 15 for details.
124
We then average across episodes to make our results comparable with those in Table
15.
We present two models, the benchmark and one with GDP in the profit function
and a variable interest rate in the investment equation. Both of them, particu-
larly the latter, do quite well at matching the actual data, particularly in terms
of comparison between the immediate aftermath of the fiscal adjustment and the
"base" (i.e. immediately before). For instance, with the richer model we predict a
difference in the average rate of growth of investment before and after "expansion-
ary" fiscal adjustment of 4.13 compared to 5.60 in the data, and of -4.68 against
-4.30 in the case of "contractionary" fiscal adjustments. In some cases the model
predicts the "jumps" of the investment share with one year delay relative to the
actual data. A more thorough analysis of this timing issue would require quarterly
data on fiscal variables, which are not available for many OEeD countries.42
Finally, we investigated whether the behavior of profits and investment is struc-
turally different following large changes in the fiscal policy stance. We pursued this
investigation in a variety of ways. First we checked whether a quadratic term on
spending and taxes was significant in the profit equation; it was not. Second,
we checked for structural breaks in the profit equation, in the fonn of significant
breaks in the constant or in the coefficients of spending and taxes in the profit
equations. We also explored the possibility of structural breaks in the investment
42See Blanchard and Perotti (1998) for a paper using quarterly fiscal data on the US.
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equations. In both cases, we did not find any evidence of structural breaks.
In summary, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the effect of
fiscal policy (and its components) on investment is not different in "normal" times
and around major fiscal adjustments. Since much of the effects of the latter on
the economy go through investments, this evidence casts doubts on the need of
developing special theories on the effects of large adjustments.
Finally, we have also performed the analogous experiments on episodes of loose
fiscal policies. Our results (available upon request) are very similar, (with the
opposite sign) to those obtained for fiscal adjustments.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that in OEeD countries changes in fiscal policy have important
effects on private business investment. Interestingly, the strongest effects arise
from changes in primary government spending and, especially, government wages.
. We provide evidence consistent with a labor market channel through which fiscal
policy influences labor costs, profits, investment and, as a consequence, growth.
Increases in public wages and/or employment and transfers increase wage pressure
in the private sector, both in unionized and competitive labor markets. Also,
workers in the private sector may react to tax hikes by asking for higher pre-tax
real wages (or decreasing labor supply), once again putting pressures 011 profits
and investment.
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These effects on investment go a long way toward explaining those episodes of
expansionary fiscal contractions that have recently attracted considerable atten-
tion. According to our results, the surge in private investment that accompanies
the large spending cuts during these episodes is exactly what one should expect.
In fact, we found very little evidence, if any at all, that private investment reacts
differently during these large fiscal adjustments than in "normal" circumstances.
The driving channel of our results is the effect of fiscal policy changes on cur-
rent and future expected profits. This suggests that two issues deserve further
examination. One is a more thorough examination on the effects of fiscal policy on
interest rates. Even though we allowed for interest rate movements, there is cer-
tainly still room for further investigation of the effect of changes (especially large
ones) of the fiscal stance on interest rates. This investigation may shed additional
light on the role of "credibility effects" of fiscal adjustments on interest rates. The
second issue is the change in income distribution which follows large changes in
the fiscal stance, and particularly, fiscal adjustments of various types. While there
is ample evidence that spending cuts can be expansionary, our evidence on profits
may imply that spending cuts may increase income inequality. Whether this is the
case or not is an important topic for future research.
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8 Data Appendix
Variables' definitions
1/K: Business investment as a share of capital stock
7[: Profits gross of corporate tax payments as a share of capital stock Profits are
value added in business sector minus labor costs in the business sector.
7[*: Profits net of corporate tax payments as a share of capital stock Profits are
value added in business sector minus labor costs in the business sector.
S / K: Sales in the business sector as a share of the capital stock
Labor Costs in the business sector: Labor compensation rate in the business
sector times total employment of the business sector. The nurnber of the unpaid
family workers are deducted from total employment of the business sector because
their output is not measured. We followed Blanchard (1997) in doing this ad-
justment. When the number of unpaid family workers is not available from the
beginning of the sample, for each country, we assume that the ratio of unpaid
family workers to total employment is equal to the one in the first year for which
the data are available.
W P: log of real labor compensation rate in the business sector. Labor compensa-
tion rate in the business sector (variable WSSE in the OECD database) includes
total social security payments.
r: Short term nominal interest rate net of corporate tax minus one period ahead
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(ex-post) inflation, calculated using GDP deflator
G: Primary spending (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP. Primary spend-
ing = TRAN + GW + GNW + GINV + subsidies + other net capital outlays
R: Total revenues (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP. Total revenues =
TLAB + TBUS + TIND +other transfers received by gov
TRAN: Transfers (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP
GW: wage component of current government spending on goods and services, as
a share of trend GDP
GNW: non wage component of current government spending on goods and ser-
vices, as a share of trend GDP
GINV: Government investment as a share of trend GDP
T LAB: Labor taxes (direct taxes on households + social security and payroll
taxes, cyclically adjusted), as a share of trend GDP
T BUS: Direct taxes on business (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP
TIND: Indirect taxes (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP
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Summary statistics
Nabs. mean st. dey.
11K 635 0.07 0.03
II 606 0.15 0.12
fr 601 0.14 0.11
SIK 624 0.42 0.22
r 465 0.02 0.04
G 653 0.37 0.09
R 628 0.36 0.09
TRAN 661 0.14 0.06
GW 653 0.11 0.03
GNW 653 0.05 0.02
GINV 658 0.03 0.01
TLAB 645 0.20 0.07
TIND 661 0.13 0.03
TBUS 640 0.03 0.01
Source: OECD.
130
Table 1: Profits: benchmark regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
IIK(-l) 0.67 0.64 0.77
(17.45) (16.54) (21.17)
IIK( -2) 0.03 0.04 0.005
(0.94) (1.49) (0.18)
R -0.09 -0.14 -0.11
(-3.05) (-4.73) (-2.67)
G -0.09 -0.08 -0.11
(-4.31) (-3.72) (-3.35)
R'" 0.56 0.55 0.71
Nabs 555 555 565
Dependent variable: marginal profit ilK.
Marginal profit proxied by average profit gross of
corporate taxes as a share of the capital stock (11-)
in column 1, by average profit net of the corpo-
rate tax rate as a share of the capital stock (71"*)
in column 2, by sales to capital ratio (S/ K) in
column 3. Variables are in levels, and detrended
allowing for country specific linear and quadratic
term. Revenues (R) and primary spending (G)
are cyclically adjusted and in share of trend GDP.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 2: Profits: spending components.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IIK ( -1) 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.70
(17.41) (17.27) (18.29) (18.11)
IIK ( -2) 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.50) (1.48) (0.43) (0.55)
R -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12
(-3.19) (-3.27) (-3.43) (-3.90)
TRAN -0.11
(-2.45)
GW -0.43
(-6.33)
GNW -0.22
(-1.91)
GI -0.3
(-3.29)
R~ 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.56
Nabs 555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: margmal profit ilK. Margmal profit
proxied by average profit gross of corporate taxes as a share
of the capital stock (11'). See also notes to Table 1 and
Appendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Profits: revenue components.
(1) (2) (3)
IlK (-1) 0.66 0.68 0.68
(17.03) (17.45) (17.54)
IlK (-2) 0.03 0.02 0.02
(1.16) (0.83) (0.82)
G -0.07 -0.10 -0.10
(-3.04) (-4.56) (-4.70)
TLAB -0.16
(-4.25)
TYB 0.02
(0.31)
TIND
-0.008
(-0.13)
R~ 0.57 0.56 0.56
Nabs 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit IlK.
Marginal profit proxied by average profit grOBS
of corporate taxes as a share of the capital stock
(71"). See also notes to Table 1 and Appendix A.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 4: Investment equation: benchmark regressions.
(fT (2) T3) (4)
>. 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.06
(8.95) (8.35) (8.75) (8.48)
>'(-1) 0.007 0.008 -0.005 0.05
(0.63) (0.68) (-0.89) (7.35)
R~ 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.56
AR(l)coef. 0.39,0.78 0.49,0.80 0.43,0.77 0.50,0.80
Nabs 537 537 551 537
Dependent variable: investment rate (I j K). Marginal profit proxied
by average profit gross of corporate taxes as a share of the capital
stock (71") in column 1 and 4, by average profit net of the corporate
tax rate as a share of the capital stock (71".) in column 2, by sales
to capital ratio (SjK) in column 3. Variables are in levels, and de-
trended allowing for country specific linear and quadratic term. We
allow the AR(l) coefficient to differ across countries. The lowest and
highest values are reported. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Dynamic effects of fiscal shocks.
o yr. 1yr. 2 yrs. 3 yrs. 4 yrs. 5.yrs. sum sum sum
oto 5 o to 10 o to 20
Effects of a unitary shock
G -.16** -.17** -.16** -.13** -.10** -.07* -.80** -.95** -.98**
R -.07* -.06 -.04 -.01 0.00 0.00 -.18 -.16 -.16
Net effect -.23 -.23 -.20 -.14 -.10 -.07 -.98 -1.11 -1.14
TRAN -.22** -.24** -.22** -.19** -.15** -.11* -1.13** -1.34** -1.38**
GW -.51** -.64** -.58** -.47** -.34** -.23* -2.77** -3.08** -3.15**
GINV -.39** -.38** -.32* -.25* -.18* -.13* -1.64* -1.89* -1.95*
TLAB -.17** -.18** -.14· -.09* -.06 -.03 -.69* -.74* -.75*
See notes to Table 1 and Appendix A. ** (*) indicates that zero is outside the 95% (68%) confidence band.
Table 6: GDP in the profit equation.
(1) (2) T3) 14)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
llK(-I) 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.55
(14.98) (12.83) (15.76) (15.60)
llK(-2) -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09
(-5.11) (-2.26) (-2.94) (-3.33)
R -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
(-3.09) (-3.28) (-3.21) (-3.20)
G -0.094 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09
(-5.27) (-5.49) (-5.13) (-5.18)
GDPP 0.27 0.19 0.20
(16.05) (8.45) (9.39)
GDPP(-I) 0.15
(7.49)
R~ 0.70 0.60 0.69 0.69
Nabs 555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: margInal profit llK. MargInal profit proxled
by average profit gross of corporate taxes as a share of the capital
stock (71"). See also notes to Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics in
parenthesis.
GDPP =(GDP-Government Consumption)/K
Instruments in (3) llK(-I), llK(-2), R, G, GDP(-I)
Instruments in (4) nK(-I), nK(-2), R, G, GDP(-I),
R(-I), G(-I).
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Table 7: Profits, labor costs and fiscal policy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
28L8 28L8 28L8 28L8 28L8 28L8 28L8 28L8
llK(-l) 0.55 0.66 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.55 0.54
(12.02) (16.70) (15.49) (15.40) (12.17) (16.79) (15.65) (15.61)
llK(-2) 0.07 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.08
(2.15) (0.93) (-2.86) (-3.02) (1.86) (0.83) (-2.85) (-3.06)
WP -0.19 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(-6.47) (-4.62) (-6.00) (-6.22) (-4.88) (-4.08) (-5.27) (-5.14)
CDPP 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18
(8.56) (9.04) (8.26) (8.72)
R~ 0.56 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.71
Nabs 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit (llK)' Marginal profit proxied by average profit gross of corporate taxes
as a share of the capital stock ('rr). See also notes to Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
W P=log of real labor compensation rate of the business sector
GDPP =(GDP-Government Consumption)/K
Instruments in (1) llK( -I), llK( -2), GW
Instruments in (2) llK(~I), llK(~2),GW,WP(-I)
Instruments in (3) llK(-I), llK(-2), GW, WP(-l), GDP(-I)
Instruments in (4) llK(-l), llK(-2), GW, WP(-l), GDP(-I) ,TLAB
Instruments in (5) llK(-l), llK(-2), G
Instruments in (6) llK(-l), llK(-2), G, WP(-l)
Instruments in (7) llK(-l), llK(-2), G, WP(-l), GDP(-l)
Instruments in (8) llK(-l), llK(-2), G, WP(-l), GDP(-l),R.
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Table 8: Labor costs and fiscal policy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IlK(-1) -0.60 -0.02 0.29 0.31 -0.64 -0.03 0.25 0.24
(-5.09) (-0.21) (2.91) (3.16) (-5.37) (-0.31) (2.54) (2.43)
IlK (-2) 0.14 0.08 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.10 0.27 0.27
(1.58) (1.24) (3.74) (3.60) (2.14) (1.59) (3.89) (3.90)
GW 2.28 0.81 0.92 0.82
(11.06) (4.95) (5.80) (5.02)
TLAB 0.20
(2.47)
G 0.61 0.17 0.19 0.19
(9.26) (3.37) (3.79) (3.83)
R
-0.04
(-0.62)
WP(-1) 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.77
(22.46) (23.96) (23.79) (23.22) (24.56) (23.88)
GDPP(-1) -0.29 -0.29 -0.27 -0.27
(-6.27) (-6.31) (-5.76) (-5.71)
R'I. 0.24 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.20 0.60 0.62 0.62
lVobs 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555
This table displays the first stage regressions for the corresponsing 2SLS regressions of Table 7.
Dependent variable: WP=log of real labor compensation rate of the business sector.
T-statistics in parenthesis. See Table 1 and Appendix A.
135
Table 9: Profits and investment: estimation in differences.
(1) (2)
~I1K(-1) 0.28 ~A 0.01
(7.02) (7.97)
~IIK(-2) 0.16 ~A(-1) 0.003
(5.08) (2.02)
~R -0.28
(-6.61)
~G -0.17
(-4.35)
R~ 0.41 R~ 0.12
Nobs 544 Nobs 507
Dependent variables: change in marginal profit
~IIK in column 1 and change investment rate
~(I/ K) in column 2. Change in marginal profit
proxied by change in average profit gross of corpo-
rate taxes as a share of the capital stock (~7r).
Variables are in first differences. Country fixed
effects are included. Revenues (R) and primary
spending (G) are cyclically adjusted and in share
of trend GDP. See also Appendix A. T-statistics
in parenthesis.
Table 10: Dynamic effects of fiscal shocks: estimation in differences.
o yr. 1yr. 2 yrs. 3 yrs. 4 yrs. 5.yrs. sum sum sum
o to 5 o to 10 Oto 20
Effects of a unitary shock
G -.1 ** -.13** -.13** -.14** -.14** -.14** -.77** -1.49* * -2.93**
R -.11 ** -.14** -.15** -.15** -.15** -.15** -.87** -1.64** -3.19**
Net effect -.21 -.27 -.28 -.29 -.29 -.29 -1.64 -3.13 -6.12
TRAN -.06 -.08 -.08 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.48 -.95 -1.88
GW -.35** -.49** -.52** -.53** -.54** -.55** -3.00** -5.79** -11.39**
GINv' -.21 ** -.27** -.29** -.30** -.31* -.31* -1.69** -3.26** -6.39*
TLAB -.15** -.20** -.21** -.21 ** -.22** -.22** -1.20** -2.30** -4.50* *
See notes to Table 9 and Appendix A.
** (*) indicates that zero is outside the 95% (68%) confidence band.
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Table 11: Variable discount factor.
(1) (2)
r(-l) 0.45 >..prof 0.08
(9.78) (6.72)
r(-2) -0.21 >..prof(-1) 0.03
(-4.83) (2.71)
R 0.27 >..rint -0.06
(2.98) (-5.76)
G -0.13 >..rint(-l) -0.05
(-2.10) (-4.28)
>..ctax -0.007
(-0.58)
>..ctax(-l) 0.01
(1.10)
R~ 0.20 R~ 0.59
AR(l)coef. 0.48,0.80
Nobs 429 Nobs 429
Dependent variables: real ex-post interest rate rin col-
umn 1 and investment rate I I K in column 2. See also
notes to Table 1 and Appendix A. T -statistics in paren-
thesis.
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Table 12: Profits: revenue components, with year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I1K(-l) 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.69
(17.81) (17.37) (17.66) (17.81)
IIK ( -2) 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
(1.95) (2.05) (1.72) (1.71)
G -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06
(-1.75) (-1.21) (-2.66) (-2.68)
R -0.12
(-4.19)
TLAB -0.15
(-4.27)
TYB 0.02
(0.36)
TIND -0.12
(-1.97)
R-': 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65
Nabs 555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit 11K. Marginal profit prox-
ied by average profit gross of corporate taxes as a share of the
capital stock (71-). Year dummies are included. See also notes
to Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 13: Profits: spending components, with year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IIK(-I) 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.69
(17.84) (17.51) (17.92) (17.71)
IIK (-2) 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
(1.77) (2.39) (1.76) (1.89)
R -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13
(-4.50) (-4.05) (-4.70) (-4.76)
TRAN -0.006
(-0.12)
Gl¥ -0.29
(-4.15)
GNW -0.001
(-0.01 )
GI -0.18
(-2.04)
R'L. 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66
Nabs 555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit ilK- Marginal profit prox-
ied by average profit gross of corporate taxes as a share of the
capital stock (71"). Year dummies are included. See also notes
to Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 14: Investment equation and financial constraints.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 16; (7)
7r*
-0.04
(-0.54)
7r*(-1) 0.07
(1.78)
A 0.09 0.07
(5.73) (3.69)
A(-l) 0.03 0.04
(1.64) (0.40)
Et- 1 [7r tJ 0.30 0.25 0.25
(9.38) (3.56) (2.38)
Lag (Et- 1 [7rt]) -0.005 0.01 -0.05
(-0.16) (0.18) (-0.46)
E t- 1 [E;=a {3i 7rt+i ] 0.18 0.14 0.03 0.04
(9.26) (9.14) (0.85) (0.52)
LagEt- 1 [E~=a (3i 7rt+i] 0.002 0.005 -0.006 0.04
(0.13) (0.34) (0.85) (0.47)
AR(l)coef. 0.45 0.47 0.46, 0.48, 0.46, 0.41, 0.41,
0.80 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.78 0.77
Nabs 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
Dep. var: Investment rate=(I/K)
(1) Instruments: G, G(-I), R, R(-I), A, A(-l), 7rK(-I)
(4) a = 0, b = 1
(5) a = 0, b = 2
(6) a = 1, b -t 00
(7) a = 1, b = 2
T-statistics in parenthesis. See Table 1 and Appendix A.
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Table 15: Fiscal adjustments: Fiscal policy and macroeconomic indicators.
,
Expansionary Contractionary
Bef. Dur. Aft. Aft.-Bef Bef. Dur. Aft. Aft.-Bef.
Primary Spending 42.96 41.71 41.36 -1.60 40.32 40.24 40.15 -0.17
(1.43) (1.42) (1.35) * (1.36) (1.37) (1.40)
Total Revenue 40.10 41.42 41.57 1.47 36.97 39.03 39.65 2.69
(1.45) (1.43) (1.41) * (1.48) (1.51) (1.58) *GDP Growth rate -0.79 -0.45 -0.19 0.60 0.82 -1.12 -0.86 -1.68
(deviation from G7) (0.24) (0.33) (0.31) (0.40) (0.44) (0.28) *GDP Growth rate 1.31 2.65 3.41 2.10 3.73 1.34 1.91 -1.82
(0.24) (0.39) (0.29) * (0.37) (0.34) (0.27) *~ Priv.Consumption 1.16 2.30 3.03 1.87 3.76 1.19 1.84 -1.93
(0.36) (0.38) (0.30) * (0.55) (0.45) (0.31) *~ Bus.Investment -0.36 3.49 5.24 5.60 4.59 -0.39 0.29 -4.30
(0.99) (1.24) (1.13) * (1.22) (1.60) (1.31) *
Contribution to real
GDP Growth from
Priv.Consumption 51.37 51.09 51.82 0.45 58.41 48.92 57.78 -0.63
Bus.Investment -6.55 16.44 17.17 23.72 13.40 -7.22 -0.84 -14.23
Residen.Investment -23.78 0.19 2.90 26.69 4.88 -7.07 1.15 -3.73
Stockbuilding -16.08 1.58 7.60 23.68 2.12 2.16 -12.28 -14.39
Net Export 69.36 29.60 4.08 -65.28 -2.33 30.60 37.04 39.37
Gov.Consumption 28.28 6.37 12.71 -15.57 17.95 27.25 20.01 2.06
Gov.Investment -6.86 -6.94 2.23 9.09 3.54 -10.95 -4.86 -8.40
Source GEeD: Primary Spending and Total Revenue are III share of trend GDP and cyclIcally adjusted. GDP Growth
rate(G7) is real GDP growth in deviation from the average (GDP weights) G7 real growth rate. LlPriv.Consumption
and LlBus.Investment are growth rate of real private consumption and real business investment. The contributions
to real GDP growth from the different GDP components have been calculated using the following formula.
Let sh= the contribution to real GDP growth from the X component:
E .1((Xjt -Xjt-I)/Xjt-l)*Xjt-tlGDPjt-dsh = -=,,-1_~ ~...... ---:__L j IeGDPjt -GDPjt - 1 )/GDPjt_ II
An episode of fiscal adjustment is expansionary (contractionary) if the primary cyclically adjusted balance as a share
of trend GDP improves by at least 2% in one year or by 1.25% in two consecutive years and the average real GDP
growth in each adjustment year and in the two years after is greater (lower) than the average real GDP growth in the
two years before.
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Table 16: Business Investment around fiscal adjustments.
Expansionary Contractionary
Bef. Dur. Aft. Diff. Bef. Dur. Aft. Diff.
(a) (b) (c) (c-a) (a) (b) (c) (c-a)
Data
GDP Growth rate 1.31 2.65 3.41 2.10 3.73 1.34 1.91 -1.82
(0.24) (0.39) (0.29) * (0.37) (0.34) (0.27) *
~ Bus.Investment -0.36 3.49 5.24 5.60 4.59 -0.39 0.29 -4.30
(0.99) (1.24) (1.13) * (1.22) (1.60) (1.31) *
Bus.Investment contribution -6.55 16.44 17.17 23.72 13.40 -7.22 -0.84 -14.23
to GDP Growth
Benchmark model
~ Bus.Investment 1.01 2.35 4.05 3.04 2.64 4.56 0.08 -2.56
Bus.Investment contribution 7.11 10.03 13.12 6.01 6.97 41.13 -0.06 -7.04
to GDP Growth
Model with GDP and
variable discount factor
~ Bus.Investment 0.06 -0.59 4.19 4.13 3.85 2.82 -0.83 -4.68
Bus.Investment contribution -2.50 -4.83 13.12 15.62 11.82 26.79 -5.86 -17.69
to GDP Growth
See Table 15.
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Figure 1
Effect ofan increase in public employment, labor taxes, or unemployment benefits
AA=O
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy in Unionized Labor
Markets
1 Introduction
Chapter 1 and 2 show that the composition of the fiscal consolidation is critical for
the reduction of the debt-t<rGDP ratio and for the reaction of the macroeconomy
to the adjustments. Fiscal stabilizations achieved by cutting public spending, and
especially transfers and the government wage bill, rather than increasing taxation,
are more likely to be successful in reducing public debt, and in inducing an eco-
nomic expansion. There are a variety of papers that confirm this evidence in the
literaturel , and, very recently, the European Commission acknowledged the need
to put more emphasis on the composition of the budget, perhaps even imposing
less stringent targets on the level of the deficit-t<rGDP ratio. Despite the lively
empirical literature on the subject, and the interest it is receiving at the political
level, little theoretical work has been done to study the channels through which
the composition of fiscal stabilizations affects the macroeconomy.
The motivation of this paper is to set up a dynamic general equilibriuln model
lSee Alesina et al (1999), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), Alesina and Ardagna (1998),
Ardagna (1999), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermot and Wescott (1996), IMF (1996).
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to investigate the long and short run effects that changes in different spending
and revenue items of the budget have on the economy when the labor market is
unionized.
Alesina and Perotti (1997), using a static model, sugge~t that fiscal policy in-
fluences the economy through the labor market, and firms' cost side. In unionized
and imperfect labor markets, an increase in labor taxes, government wages, pub-
lie employment, and transfers creates wage pressure for the private sector, reduces
firms' profitability, and competitiveness, leading to lower employment, and output.
Alesina et al. (1999) show, in a partial equilibrium model, that business investment
can be affected as well through the same channel. This paper studies the reac-
tion of employment, capital, output, consumption, and the government balance to
changes in public employment, wages of the public sector employees, unemploy-
ment benefits, tax rates on labor and on capital income, and finds support for the
labor market channel in general equilibrium.
Calibrating the model with average data of the European countries, the paper
shows that a 1% increase in public employment or in labor taxes reduces output by
about 0.5% on impact, and by 0.7% in steady state. The effect from a 1% increase
in wages of public employees and unemployment benefit is larger and equal to
-0.9%, "and -0.8% on impact, and -1.3% and -1.2% in steady state. Interestingly,
a 1% increase in taxes on capital have a lower effect on output. The steady state
level of output is only 0.06% lower than in the initial steady state.2
2This result is consistent with the evidence by Alesina et a1. (1999), who find that the
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Certainly, this is not the first paper that studies the response of the economy
to changes in alternative budget items in a dynamic general equilibrium context.
However, contrary, for example, to Baxter and King (1993), Dotsey and Mao
(1994), Finn (1998), Ludvigson (1996), Mendoza and Tesar (1999), this paper
departures from the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market. This
extension is important for two reasons. First of all, a unionized labor market that
generates a positive unemployment rate in equilibrium seems more realistic and
consistent with the evidence from the European countries. Second, the results of
the effect that some fiscal policy variables, like taxes on labor, have on the economy
through the supply-side do not hinge on high and unrealistic values of the elasticity
of the individual labor supply.
This paper is more closely related to the one by Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999),
and extends it in several directions. As their paper, it assumes a monopolistic
union, but it does not only study the steady state effects of changes in fiscal policy.
It also analyzes the dynamic behavior of the economy during the transition period.
Second, it shows the response of the macroeconomy not only to capital, labor taxes,
and to unemployment benefits, but also to changes in public employment and
wages of the public sector employees. Finally, it departures from the assumption
of a budget balance, and analyzes the dynamic behavior of the deficit-to-GDP ratio
to changes in different budget items.
investment rate reacts more to changes in the government wage bill, and in labor taxes than to
changes in taxes on capital.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and the pa-
rameters used for the calibration. Section 3 shows the response of output, employ-
ment, capital, consumption, primary deficit to increases in the fiscal policy items
discussed above. Section 4 presents some sensitivity analysis. The last section
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The set-up
The economy is populated by infinitely lived individuals, who differ in their source
of income, and the choices they make in each period. There are two types of agents
in this economy: capitalists, and workers.
2.1.1 The household
Capitalists are identical, they own the firms, and their only source of income is from
capital and public bonds. The representative capitalist takes both consumption
and investment decisions and maximizes an intertemporal utility function
(1)
subject to his budget constraint and the equation for the capital accumulation
process.
(2)
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(3)
Ck represents the purchases of consumption goods by the representative capitalist,
and 1 his investment in capital goods. B are public bonds, K capital goods, r B and
r are the real rate of return of public bonds and capital respectively, 6 is the rate
at which capital depreciates. T k is the tax rate on capital income, while the model
assumes that income from public bonds is not taxed. The first order conditions
for the representative capitalist are
(4)
(5)
(6)
Workers derive utility only from consumption of private goods. The utility
function is identical across individuals, U = log(Cwt). For simplicity, we assume
that, in each period, a worker spends all his disposable income on private consump-
tion, but he receives a different income according to his status. Workers can be
employed in the private or public sector, or they can be unemployed. If employed
in the private or public sector, they offer inelastically one unit of labor, and receive
a wage rate wp , and wg , respectively. If they are unemployed., they receive a sub-
sidy u from the government. Wage income is taxed at a rate TN, unemployrnent
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benefits are not3 • The following equations describe the consumption level of the
three types of workers.
Cut = Ut
(7)
(8)
(9)
Given the level of private and public sector employment, workers are randomly
assigned to one sector or the other or are unemployed. Workers in the private or
public sector do not have different skills, nor jobs have different characteristics that
affect preferences, and the model does not explain why workers receive a different
salary in the two sectors. Workers are ex-ante identical, and they become ex-post
heterogenous, once the level of employment in the private and public sector is
fixed, because they will receive a different income according to their status. The
labor force is organized in unions.
2.1.2 The private sector
Unions unilaterally set wages in the private sector to maximize the expected utility
of their members. Entrepreneurs choose the profit maximizing level of employment
3 Although this assumption too extreme for many countries, relaxing it does not change the
qualitative nature of the remIts. In order to have an effect of labor taxes on the wage rate of the
private sector, the crucial assumption is that unemployed benefits are taxed at a rate lower than
labor income, which is the case in most countries.
149
and capital.
Unions are small compared to the size of the economy, and, therefore, set wages
at the firm level . As it is known, the monopoly union model does not lead to an
efficient wage-employment outcome. However, it has been used. in the literature
to study the effects of fiscal policy in non-competitive labor markets because it
simplify the analysis, and gives results that qualitatively do not differ from those
that one obtains in a model in which unions and firms bargain over the wage, and
the employment level.4
The timing of the game between firms and unions is the following. The capital
stock is chosen at the beginning of the period before unions choose wages. Once
wages have been set, firms choose the profit maximizing level of employment along
the labor demand curve. This is the same structure as the one in Daveri and
Maffezzoli (1999), Daveri and Tabellini (1998). Because unions are small, and
negotiate wages at the firm level, it is not unreasonable to assume that they take
the rental price of capital, and the fiscal policy variables as given. The model
also assumes that unions are myopic, and solve a static optimization problem in
each period. Hence, they do not internalize the effects of the wage rate on capital
accumulation, total income and employment.5
4See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1997).
5Van der Ploeg (1987) shows that the solution to the one period union model is the time
consistent contract in a dynamic game in which the union has an intertemporal utility function
and acts as a Stackelberg leader.
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Firms are identical, and produce an homogeneous consumption good with cap-
ital and labor, taking prices as given. The production function is Cobb-Douglas
(10)
Y represents output, K the capital stock, Np the number of workers employed in
the private sector, X the state of technology, a the capital share, and G are publicly
produced services which affect the productivity of capital and labor. Technology
is labor-augmenting and grows exogenously at a rate x.
Given the timing above, the equilibrium level of employment, capital and the
wage rate can be obtained solving the game between the firms and the unions
backwards. The representative firm employs labor according to the marginal pro-
ductivity rule,
Yt(1- a)- = WptNpt
Unions choose wp to maximize
subject to equation (11).
(11)
(12)
UA is the expected utility unions members receive when they are not employed
in the private sector, Nw is the total number of workers (by assumption equal
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to unions' membership), 7t measures the probability of being employed in the
private sector.
Substituting (11) into (12), and taking into account (10), one can derive the
first order condition for the union:
(13)
Thus, the equilibrium wage rate in the private sector depends on workers' expected
utility when they are not employed in the private sector.
UA is the weighted average of workers' utility if employed in the public sector
and if unemployed, with weights equal to the probability of being employed in the
public sector and of being unemployed.
(14)
where, in equilibrium, p = N~~Pt
Hence,
Ngt (Nw - Npt - Ngt ) ()log(W pt(1 - TNt)) = N. log(Wgt(1 - TNt)) + N. _ N. log Ut + aNw - pt w pt
(15)
Finally, firms choose the optimal level of capital subject to the wage rate set by
the union. Because the optimal wage rate in (15) does not depend on the capital
stock the standard first order condition for the firm holds.,
(16)
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2.1.3 The government
The government uses public employees to produce services, G with one unit of
labor input per unit of output. Hence, the number of public workers Ng is also
equal to the services produced.
Wages for the public sector employees wg are set by the government. The as-
sumption on the asymmetry in the wage setting procedure between the private and
public sector is strong, and also departures from the literature. However, it allows
to study the effect of changes of public wages on the economy without further com-
plicating the model. Calmfors and Horn (1986) introduce public employment in a
monopolistic union model, but assume that the union chooses the same wage rate
for workers in the public and private sector. Holmund (1997) allows for different
wages in the private and public sector, but he models the wage bargaining between
unions, firms and the government in a model without capital accumulation. On
one hand, extending Holmund (1997) would complicate the analysis beyond the
scope of this work, and would increase the number of parameters to keep truck in
the calibration exercise. On the other, following Calmfors and Horn (1986) one
cannot study the effect that changes in the wages for public workers have on the
economy, shutting down a channel that is empirically important.6
6As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large body of empirical evidence suggesting
that the composition of fiscal consolidations, and fiscal policy in general, matters and affect the
economy through the labor market. An increase in the governement wage bill has a spillover
effects on wages in the private sector, reducing firms' profitability, capital accumulation and
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The government also pays an unemployment subsidy, u, to each unemployed
household of this economy. Public spending is financed by the revenue from la-
bor taxes and issuing debt, B. Equation (17) describes the government budget
constraint.
(17)
Government spending and tax rates are exogenously chosen. In each period, the
government fixes the tax rates TN, and Tk, public employment as a share of the
labor force ng, the wage rate of the public sector employees and the unemployment
benefits as a share of the wage in the private sector, wg and u respectively7. Hence,
. Ngt = ngt
Wgt = Wgtwpt
(18)
(19)
(20)
growth. Many episodes of fiscal stabilizations also provide evidence that wages in the public
sector change more than public employment. Thus, allowing wages to be different between the
two sectors adds realism to the analysis.
7 One could also assume that the government chooses the number of public workers, and wages
and unemployment benefits in absolute terms. However, this choice would make the calibration
of the model more cumbersome.
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Given equations (18) - (20), and the tax rates TN, and Tk, the government issues
new debt to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, given by equation (17).
The government also faces a no-Ponzi game constraint lim (IIT=o(l +rB))BT = 0'T~oo t- t ,
which implies that the present value of government expenditures equals the present
value of tax revenues plus the initial stock of public debt.
Finally, in each period, the economy's resource constraint holds.
where Nk is the number of capitalists in the economy and Nk +Nw is normalized
to one.
2.2 Equilibrium
The first order conditions for capitalists, workers, firms, and unions, together with
the constraints (3), (17), (21), and the equations (10), (18), (19), (20) define a
system of non-linear difference equations that describe the dynamic behavior for
the economy.
Because in steady state the economy grows at the exogenous rate x, the dynamic
system in section 2.1 is non-stationary. Normalizing it with respect to X t , and
substituting r B = ((1 - Tk)r - 8) in equation (17), (7), (8), (9) into equation
(21), (18), (19), (20) in equations (15), (17), and (21), one obtains the following
stationary system of non-linear difference equations.
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Yt(1 - a)- = WptNpt
Npt = N
w
_ n;t[log(w;;t) + log(l - TNt) - log(ut)]
log(l - TNt) - log(Ut) - a
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
v KU1\T l-u~
I t = t 1'fpt ngt
where quantity variables are now divided by the technology parameter X t .
(28)
(29)
We can, thus, define the equilibrium for the economy described by equations
(22) - (29) as a sequence of endogenous quantity and price variables {Bt+11 Kt+1 ,
Ckt, Npt , Yt, It, T't, Wpt} that satisfy equations (22) - (29) given the sequence of
the exogenous variables {TNt, TKt, ngt, Wgt, itt}, and the initial values of the
predetermined ones {Bt , Kt }.
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2.3 Steady state and transitional dynamics
Numerical solutions of changes in any exogenous fiscal policy variable involve the
computation of the long-run, balanced-growth path equilibria before and after the
change occurs, and of the transitional dynamics between the two steady state
equilibria.
Equations (30)-(37) define the steady state equilibrium for this economy. Along
the balanced growth path, quantity variables grow at rate x. Equation (22) shows
that the rate of return on capital, hence on public debt, is a constant along the
balanced growth path
(30)
This result can be replaced in (23), to obtain the constant output-to-capital ratio.
y* r*
-=-
K* a
(31)
Equation (25) defines the steady state level of employment in the private sector,
* n;*[log(wg *) + log(l - TN) -log(U*)]N - N - ~~;;...;...~---..;....;....-~------
p - w log(l - TN) -log(U*) - a (32)
and substituting it in the equation (24) one obtains the steady state wage rate in
the private sector as a share of output.
w· 1
2 = (l-a)-
Y* N*p
(33)
The capital accumulation equation (28) can be used to determine the constant
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investment to output ratio,
(34)
and the resource constraint determines the,capitalist's consumption-to-output ratio
c· 1 w* w* w* l*
_k = -(1- N·2(1- .) .....-----* p (1 *) (N N* -)-* P )Y* N" P Y* TN - ng Wg Y* - TN - W - P - ng U Y* - y.
(35)
Finally, the steady state relation among public expenditures, tax revenues and
public debt is described by
B*
y. (x - (1 - TZ)r - 1 + 6) W* w*-=-"'- P + (1\ T N* ---*)--* Png W g Y* 1V w - P - n g U Y*
w* w*
-T* (2N* +n*W*....1!..) - T*r*K*
N Y* p 9 9 y* k
(36)
and equation (29) defines the steady state capital stock
K * (Y*) 1 *= -~NK* p (37)
The dynamic response of the endogenous variables to changes of the policy
variables is described by the system of non-linear difference equations in (22) -
(29).The system is loglinearized around the steady state solutions described by
equations (30)-(37). The solution for the endogenous variables of the system is
computed following Blanchard and Kahn (1981).
2.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated at a yearly frequency. The calibration takes the V'c1lues for
the technology and preferences' parameters commonly used in the literature, and
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sets a = 1/3, 8 = 0.1, (3 = 0.99. The remaining parameters are average data for the
European countries in the Period 1985-1996. Data are from the OECD Economic
Outlook n.62. The average real growth rate of output is set to 2.47%, Nw and N K to
0.36 and 0.64 respectively, considering that these are the values of profits and wages
as a share of GDP of the European countries in 1985-1996. The value of public
employment as a share of the labor force, ng, and the wage premium between wages
in the private and public sector, W g , can be easily computed from the data. n g is
equal to 0.18, and wg to 1.08. In contrast, deriving from the data available in the
Economic Outlook the tax rate on labor and capital income, and the replacement
rate is more cumbersome. The labor tax is computed as the ratio between total
taxes on labor income and the labor tax base. Because social security contributions
paid by employees are not available, the tax rate in the benchmark model is the
average tax rate one obtains including in the numerator of the ratio only the tax
revenues on wages and salaries from the household income, and including in the
numerator the tax revenues on wages and salaries plus the social security received
by the government. The resulting value for TN is 0.36. This value is close to the
estimate by Mendoza et aL (1994), who calculate that the average labor tax in the
European countries in 1991 is 0.382. Section (4), however, investigates whether
results depend on this particular value of the tax rate. The tax rate on capital
income Tk is the ratio between total taxes on business and profits in the business
sector, and it is equal to 0.10. The replacement rate u is computed as the ratio of
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per-capita transfers individuals receive from the government and the compensation
of workers of the private sector. u is equal to 0.29 in the benchmark model. In
section (4), I also use the replacement rate computed by Blanchard and Wolfers
(1999) equal to 0.32. Finally, we need to calibrate (), the parameter that measures
the productivity of public employment in the production of private goods. To my
knowledge, there are no papers that calibrate the productivity of public workers.
Finn (1998) considers a model in which public capital affects the production of
private goods, and fixes the parameter that measures the productivity of public
capital in the production function to about one half of the parameter that measures
the productivity of private capital. I use the same criteria to choose (), and set
it equal to 2/6. In section (4), I also consider the extreme case in which public
employment is not productive at all, and, thus, () is equal to O.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters used to calibrate the model and the values
of employment, capital, investment, and total consumption as a share of output in
steady state. The values of the macroeconomic variables generated by the model
imply that the capital-to-output ratio is equal to 2.35, investment as a share of
GDP is 0.25, and total consumption as a share of GDP is 0.75. In the period
1985-1996, the average capital-to-output ratio across European countries was 2.18,
private investment as a share of GDP 0.18, public investment as a share of GDP
0.03, private consumption, net export and governnlent wage consumption were
0.59, 0.008, and 0.18 respectively. Thus, the model inlplies slightly higher capital-
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to-output ratio, and private investment-to-output ratio than the actual ones. In
the model, the ratio of total consumption to GDP is the residual component of
the national income identity (being public investment, net export and government
wage consumption zero). Hence, it is lower than in the data.
3 Policy experiments
Figures (1)- (5) show the dynamic response of capital K, employment in the pri-
vate sector Np , output Y, and total consumption C to a 1% increase in public
employment ng, wages of public sector employees W g , replacement rate 'ii, taxes on
labor income TN and taxes on capital income Tk' In each period, the graphs plot
the percentage changes of the macroeconomic variables from their initial steady
state values.
Consider for example, figure (1). A 1% increase in public employment, reduces
employment in the private sector by 1.15% on impact. Being the level of the
capital stock fixed at the time of the policy change, the capital-labor ratio increases
on impact, leading to a higher wage rate and lower rate of return on capital.
Investment decreases and output in the first period of the transition is lower than
its value in the initial steady state by 0.44%. Because the union solves a static
problem and, as shown in equation (25), employment in the private sector depends
only on fiscal policy parameters, Np immediately converges to the new steady state
value. As investment goes down, the capital stock decreases, further reducing
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output. But, as capital decreases, the capital labor ratio increases, the wage rate
decreases and the rate of return on capital increases. The process continues till the
economy converges to the new steady state, in which wp and r are back to their
initial values. In the new equilibrium, output is 0.6% lower than it was in the initial
steady state. Total consumption also converges to a lower steady state value, but,
driven by the higher consumption of public workers, on impact it increases.6%.
Figures (2) -(4) show that capital, employment in the private sector, output,
and total consumption react in a similar way to a 1% increase in wages of the
public sector employees, replacement rate, taxes on labor income. The magnitude
of the changes are also close to those due to an increase in public employment. For
example, a 1% increase in wg , reduces output by 0.88% on impact and by 1.3% in
the steady state. A 1% increase in the replacement rate has a negative effect on
output of 0.8% on impact and 1.2% in steady state, and a 1% increase in the tax
rate on labor income leads to a decrease in output by 0.45% on impact and 0.68%
in steady state.
Figure (5) simulates the effect of a 1% increase in the tax rate on capital
income. Since employment in the private sector does not depend on Tk, and the
capital stock is predetermined, output does not vary at the time of the policy
change. As the marginal product of capital decreases due to the increase in taxes,
the capital stock and output decrease and converge to a new steady state in which
output and capital are 0.05% and 0.16% lower than in the initial steady state.
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Finally, figure (6) plots the percentage change in the primary deficit from its
initial steady state value when fiscal policy variables change one at a time. To
compare effects on the budget of the same sign, the figure shows the improvement
in the primary deficit due to a 1% decrease in ng, Wg , 71, and due to a 1% increase in
TN and Tk. Consistently with the literature on fiscal adjustments, the composition
of the stabilization matters for the reduction of the primary deficit as well. A
1% decrease in public employment reduces the deficit by 7.3% on impact, and
by 7.1% in steady state. The budget improves by 9%, and by 6.5% if the ratio
of government employees to private sector employees' wages or the replacement
rate decrease by 1%. The improvement from a 1% increase in tax rates on labor
and capital income is much smaller. Due to the decrease in economic activity, the
higher tax revenues leads to an improvement in the budget of 0.5 %when the labor
tax is increased, and of 0.3% when Tk is raised.
In conclusion, the paper finds support for the labor market channel suggested
by Alesina and Perotti (1997), and confirms the empirical evidence that the com-
position of fiscal adjustments is critical for its success. Moreover, the paper shows
that departing from the assumption of perfect competitive labor markets one can
obtain a sizeable change in employment, capital stock, and output in response to a
change in labor taxes even when the individual labor supply is inelastic. In a com-
petitive labor market, as shown by Dotsey (1994) and Ludvigson (1996), one needs
a variable individual labor supply for output and investment to rise in response to
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a deficit financed tax cuts.
4 Sensitivity analysis
This section discusses some preliminary sensitivity analysis to check whether re-
sults hinge on particular values of the parameters chosen to calibrate the model. As
discussed above, the model is simulated under the following alternative scenarios.
First, we consider the case in which public employment is completely unproduc-
tive, hence the parameter () is set to zero. Second, the model is calibrated using
different values for the tax rate on labor income. TN is set to 0.23 and to 0.49.
The first value is the average labor tax rate in European countries when total
taxes includes only the revenue on wages and salaries from the household incorne.
0.49 is obtained when the total tax revenue also includes the revenue from social
security contributions. Finally, the replacement rate is set to 0.32, which is the
average value computed by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), using data from the
GEeD Jobs Study. Fiscal policy experiments are the same as in section (3), but
figures (7) - (11) show only the response of output to changes in the fiscal policy
variables.
Setting () to zero has an effect on the percentage deviation output has from
the initial steady state value only when public employment changes. As expected,
the reduction in output is larger if public employment do not contributes to the
productivity of private employment and capital.
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Lowering the tax rate on labor income from 0.36 to 0.23, smooths output
changes from the initial steady state in all policy experiments, except when the
tax rate on capital changes. Choosing 0.49 as the initial steady state value for the
labor tax rate consistently increases the response of output to the policy shock.
Finally, increasing the replacement rate from 0.29 to 0.32, output changes are
very close to the ones in the benchmark model when public employment, wages
of public sector employees and the tax rate on capital income increase. Output
decreases more than in the benchmark model when the replacement rate and the
tax on labor income vary.
Across all different scenarios, however, the macroeconomic series considered
so far, all decrease both on impact and in steady state when fiscal policy items
lllcrease.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the effect of fiscal policy in a dynamic equilibrium model when
labor markets are iIIlperfect and unionized, and shows that an increase in public
employment, wages of the public sector employees, unemployment benefits, labor
taxes have a contractionary effect on the economy. These effects occur through
the supply-side and the labor market. Unions set higher wages for the private
sector employees in response to an increase in one of the above fiscal policy items.
This reduces employment in the private sector, increases the capital-labor ratio,
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and lowers the rate of return on capital. Investment decreases and output con-
tracts. This result is obtained even if the individual labor supply is inelastic, and
contributes to the evidence that fiscal consolidations that rely mostly on spending
cuts are more likely to improve the budget, and to experience an economic boom.
There are several lines of research that this paper leaves open. First, a more de-
tailed description of the labor market could shed light on the interactions between
the government itself, and government employees, and also between the private
and public sector on the other. There is evidence, for example, that in some fiscal
consolidations, unions moderated the wage claims, and favored cuts in public em-
ployment in response to tax cuts. Second, the model can be used to analyze the
fiscal reforms that the European countries implemented in the last years. Third,
it can be interesting to extend the model to an open econonlY franlework. This
would enable to study the effect that fiscal policy has on the economy through its
impact on firms' competitiveness, extending the analysis by Alesina and Perotti
(1997) to an intertemporal context.
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Tahlp. 1· n _1
-k moclp.l
Preferences and technology
{3 a {) x ()
0.99 1/3 0.10 1+0.0147 2/6
Fiscal policy parameters
TN 0.36
Tk 0.10
ng 0.18
wg l.08
U 0.29
Steady state variables
K/Y 2.35
Np 0.30
f/Y 0.25
e/y 0.75
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Fi~re 1
1% Increase in public employment
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Figure 2
1% Increase in public wages
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Figure 3
1% Increase in replacement rate
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Figure 4
1% Increase in labor tax
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1% Increase in capital tax
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0/0 Change of output due to 10/0 increase in public employment
(sensitivity analysis)
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Figure 8
0/0 Change of output due to 1% increase in public wages
(sensitivity analysis)
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Figure 9
0/0 Change of output due to 10/0 increase in replacement rate
(sensitivity analysis)
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Figure 10
0/0 Change of output due to 10;" increase in labor tax
(sensitivity analysis)
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% Change of output due to 1% increase in capital tax
(sensitivity analysis)
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